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Keywords: school choice, school competition, treatment evaluation, cognitive and non-
cognitive skills 
JEL-codes: I24, C21 
  
Acknowledgements: 
We thank Florian Böser, Louise Johannesson, Aline Schmidt, Lennart Ziegler and Nina Öhrn for excellent research 
assistance. We also thank Mikael Lindahl, Anders Böhlmark, Jonas Vlachos, Peter Fredriksson, Christina Gathmann, 
Helena Holmlund, and seminar participants at IFAU, IFN, ZEW, Södertörns högskola, the Ratio Institute, the 
Uppsala Center for Labor Studies, Stockholm University, Helsinki Center of Economic Research, Gothenburg 
University, University of Mannheim, the CESifo Area Conference on The Economics of Education in Munich 2013, 
the 2013 Congress of the IIPF, the 2013 Conference of the EALE, and the Second Lisbon Research Workshop on 
Economics, Statistics and Econometrics of Education 2013, for valuable comments. We gratefully acknowledge 
project funding from The Swedish Research Council. The third author would furthermore like to thank IFAU and 
IFN for kindly hosting her as guest researcher on several occasions. The first author is grateful for financial support 
from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius foundation, and from Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation. The 
second author acknowledges support from the Research Center SFB 884 "Political Economy of Reforms" Project B5, 
funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The third author gratefully acknowledges financial support from 
the Leibniz Association in the research network “Non-Cognitive Skills: Acquisition and Economic Consequences” 
and from the “College for Interdisciplinary Educational Research. A Joint Initiative of the BMBF, the Jacobs 
Foundation and the Leibniz Association”. For further information on other projects of the third author and ZEW see 
www.zew.de/staff_vnl and www.zew.de/jahresbericht. 
 1 
 
1 Introduction 
The school choice reform that was introduced in Sweden in the early 1990s has 
dramatically changed the possibilities of choosing a school within the Swedish 
compulsory education system. In addition to new choice options among public schools, 
a voucher system for private schools was introduced such that students could attend 
private schools without having to pay additional tuition fees. Due to this reform, the 
system has gone from one where students with few exceptions attended the public 
school of their catchment area, to one where many students opt for another school than 
the default school, and where there exist privately run but publicly funded alternatives 
alongside the traditional public schools. 
In a companion paper (Wondratschek, Edmark & Frölich 2013a, hereafter 
abbreviated WEF13), we investigated the average effects of school choice as introduced 
by the 1992 reform, and found them to be rather modest. In particular, we found that 
more choice options had a positive but small effect on final grades from compulsory 
school, and non-existent or very small effects on long-term outcomes.  However, given 
the importance of the principle of “equivalent quality” 1 in the Swedish school system, 
not only the average effect on the whole population is of interest, but also whether the 
school choice reform has affected students of different background differently. This is 
also an important issue in the context of the Swedish policy debate, where the fear that 
children from a socio-economically disadvantaged background would be harmed in 
absolute or relative terms has been one of the main arguments against the reform.
2
  
Whether school choice is “a rising tide that lifts all boats”, to quote from the title of 
Hoxby (2003), or rather a policy that is beneficial only for a subset of students, is also a 
                                                 
1 Chapter 1, §9 of the Swedish school law (Law 2010:800) states that all students shall have access to education of 
equivalent quality. In Swedish: ”Utbildningen inom skolväsendet ska vara likvärdig inom varje skolform och inom 
fritidshemmet oavsett var i landet den anordnas.” 
2 The National Board of Education (2003), p. 45, points to the risk of increased ethnical and social segregation as one 
of the most common arguments against the choice reforms in the political debate. A descriptive analysis, that is 
available in the appendix, shows no evidence for an overall increase in school segregation in lower secondary 
education in the period after the reform, compared to before the reform. It shall however be emphasized that this is a 
rough description, and a more thorough analysis would be needed to answer the question of whether the school 
choice reform has caused more segregation. 
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topic of interest in the international policy discussion and research literature. For 
example, Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2006) report positive effects of gaining access to 
the most preferred schools on test scores among white students and students of higher-
income families in the U.S., while there are no statistically significant effects among 
African Americans and children of lower-income families. Hoxby (2000) finds a similar 
pattern in the effects of competition between U.S. public school districts on student 
educational attainment: white non-Hispanics, males and those whose parents have at 
least a high school degree are the ones who gain from more competition, but no group 
seems to lose. Deming (2011), on the other hand, finds that gaining access to a first-
choice school through a randomised lottery decreases the crime rates, but that the effect 
is concentrated among African-American male students who are defined as high risk 
based on ex ante characteristics. Previous studies of the Swedish school choice reform, 
with the exception of the companion paper of this study, WEF13, have focused 
exclusively on the expansion of privately run but publicly funded schools. The results of 
these studies (see Ahlin (2003), Sandström and Bergström (2005), Björklund, Clark, 
Edin, Fredriksson and Krueger (2005)) suggest that students from a better-off socio-
economic background gain a bit more, but importantly, no group seems to be negatively 
affected by the choice reforms. Overall, however, there are no large differences between 
students of different socio-economic background.
3
 
To date there has been no study that evaluates the effects of the full Swedish 1992 
choice reform, including the increased possibilities to choose between public schools, 
on outcomes of different groups of students. Our study serves to fill this gap. As the 
Swedish reform changed the institutional setting for the complete population and not 
just for certain target subgroups, it is especially suited to study the effects of school 
choice on different subpopulations. Moreover, given the long time since the 
introduction of the reform, we are able to evaluate long-run effects over and above mere 
short-run outcomes. We will focus our analysis on the following issues:  
First, we will investigate Quantile Treatment Effects of the reform, that is whether 
the degree of school choice affected different parts of the distribution of outcomes 
                                                 
3 Böhlmark and Lindahl (2012) also find positive overall effects of the private school expansion, but do not test for 
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differently. We will centre our analysis on distributional effects on marks at the end of 
9
th
 grade. To this end, we focus on two thresholds which are of special interest when 
looking at marks: the probability of receiving a passing grade and the probability of 
receiving a high grade.
4
 Second, we will analyse whether the reform has had 
heterogeneous effects on student outcomes with respect to the socio-economic 
background, based on parents’ education, income and immigrant status as well as the 
crime rate of the residential area. 
The dataset that we use for our analysis comprises detailed administrative data for 
the complete Swedish population born between 1972 and 1990. As the first five of these 
cohorts had already left compulsory education when the reform was introduced in 
autumn 1992, we observe both students that have and that have not been affected by the 
reform.  
We use very detailed geographical information about students’ and schools’ 
locations to construct measures of the potential degree of school choice that is available 
to each student, based on the number of schools near the students’ home. Our 
identification strategy to deal with the potential endogeneity of choice options available 
to students after the reform (due to mobility of students and schools) is to measure the 
potential degree of school choice just before the reform, that is before parents and 
schools potentially reacted to the school choice reforms with a decision on where to live 
or open a school. This means that, for a student who chooses a school after the 
introduction of the reform, we will measure choice by counting the number of schools 
near her home in 1991. For cohorts that make their choice before 1992, we will use the 
actual year in which they choose a school, as the rules of the new school choice regime 
cannot have affected the place of residence of these cohorts. 
Nevertheless, even for these unaffected cohorts, that is for students in a situation 
without free school choice, the number of schools nearby may be correlated with 
                                                                                                                                               
heterogeneous effects with respect to student background. 
4 In 1997 the grading system was changed from a grade 1–5 scale (with 5 as the top grade), to the four categories: 
Fail, Pass, Pass with distinction and Pass with special distinction. We construct our indicator variable of receiving a 
passing grade (or higher) as receiving at least a “3” in the older system, or at least a “Pass” in the later system. As 
indicator of receiving a high grade, we use receiving at least a “4” in the old system, and at least a “Pass with 
distinction” in the later system. It shall be noted that the two grading systems follow different scales, and the indicator 
variables for “Pass grade” and “High grade” will hence have a slightly different meaning for the different cohorts. 
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student outcomes via observable and unobservable factors
5
. For this reason, we include 
regional- and individual-level covariates in the estimations. Moreover, we use the five 
student cohorts that left compulsory education before the reform was enacted to control 
for the effect of having many schools nearby before the reform. This allows us to net 
out all time constant correlation – due to both observable and, most importantly, 
unobservable factors – between outcomes and having many schools close-by in a 
situation without free school choice. The identifying assumption is thus that the cohorts 
that are unaffected by the reform are a good control group for later cohorts, and that the 
correlation between the number of schools nearby and student outcomes would have 
stayed constant over time if there had been no reform. We provide suggestive evidence 
on the validity of this assumption by testing for placebo treatment effects. 
Applying this empirical strategy, we identify the differential effect of more school 
choice, measured at the time of the introduction of the reform, on student outcomes. 
Since the results are based on a pre-reform measure of school choice, the estimated 
effect, which can be characterized as an “intention-to-treat” effect, will include all 
dynamic processes, like the opening or closing of schools, which are a direct result of 
the degree of school choice that was present at the outset of the reform
6
. It shall also be 
clear that we estimate the effects of the variation in the choice options available to the 
student, and not the effect of whether the student in fact makes an active choice or not.
7
 
As a result of students’ choice options, and budgets of schools being tied to the 
number of students in one way or the other
8
, the reform simultaneously led to choice for 
students and competition among schools in many areas
9
. These two concepts, as well as 
                                                 
5 For example, it may be that areas with a higher school density have different employment opportunities which result 
in different educational levels in the neighbourhood and thus different schooling outcomes of children, independently 
of the educational quality of schools. Also, it may be that Tiebout choice moves before the reform, where parents 
move into catchment areas of good schools, have affected school density in the long run. 
6 In Section 8.1.2 in the appendix we show that the degree of school choice in 1991 and at the time when the children 
make an active school choice are closely related. 
7 As will be discussed in Section 3 there are several channels through which increased school choice options could 
affect students, both when they make active choices and when they do not. 
8 Due to the voucher that private schools get for each student, the school budget of private schools has a direct 
connection to the number of students. For public schools, the way in which the budget is tied to the number of 
students is specified at the municipal level. The corresponding rules have varied over time and across Sweden, from 
systems where the idea of vouchers has also been used for public schools to systems that have specified only broadly 
that the number of students should be taken into account when deciding about schools’ budgets. 
9 The degree to which schools compete against each other depends on several factors, such as the specific way that 
school finances are tied to the number of students, which is specified on the municipal level, the degree to which 
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indicators measuring competition and choice, are naturally closely linked, as there 
would be no competition without student choice. We will not attempt to separate 
between the two in this study but measure choice on the student level. The estimated 
effects will thus comprise both choice and related competition effects.
10
 
Our results suggest small positive or no effects of choice opportunities, depending on 
specification and outcome. We find no strong evidence of differences between 
subgroups; if anything, effects tend to be slightly more positive for disadvantaged 
groups, such as students from low-income families.  Taken together, the results indicate 
that students from a socio-economically disadvantaged or immigrant background were 
not harmed by the reform. 
 As some placebo tests fail, especially for the adult outcomes, we do not 
overinterpret such results but focus on the more robust estimates.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of 
the Swedish compulsory school system and the 1992 school choice reform, and Section 
3 discusses why the effects of the reform may differ across groups of students. Section 4 
describes the data and explores how different subgroups behaved in terms of their 
school choice behaviour before and after the reform. Section 5 explains and discusses 
our empirical strategy. Section 6 then presents the results, and Section 7 concludes. 
2 Swedish compulsory school and the 1992 
school choice reform 
Before we turn to the empirical analysis of the paper, this section will give a short 
overview of the Swedish compulsory school system and the 1992 school choice 
reform
11
. Swedish compulsory schooling comprises grades 1–9, with students starting 
                                                                                                                                               
students actually choose other than the default schools, which is likely to be related to the amount of free capacity of 
school slots in an area, and other factors. Moreover, a qualitative study conducting interviews in a central area of 
Stockholm for example reports that some head masters of public schools have agreed to not actively compete for 
students from each other’s catchment area schools (Waslander, Pater and van der Weide (2010)). 
10 In a companion paper (Wondratschek et al. 2013b), we attempted to disentangle the choice effect, i.e. the 
individual matching effect, from the competition effect. While our estimates gave some indications of positive choice 
effects and negative competition effects especially shortly after the reform, the close relation between the two 
indicators of choice opportunities faced by students and competition from other schools faced by schools made it 
difficult to empirically separate estimates of the two effects. 
11 Wondratschek et al. 2013b includes a more detailed description. 
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grade one the year they turn seven.
12
 Since elementary school (grades 1–6) and lower 
secondary school (grades 7–9) are often organised in different schools, it is common to 
change the school when starting grade 7, at the age of 13. Following previous studies on 
the Swedish school choice reform, we will focus on grades 7-9. After compulsory 
school, which has a comprehensive curriculum with some choice options like studying a 
second language, most students go on to upper secondary school, which is voluntary 
and is organised in several educational tracks. 
Since 1990, the municipalities are the responsible administrative entities for 
organising compulsory education. The main sources of finance are the local income 
taxes and central government grants.
13
 The central government, however, steers 
compulsory schooling through providing rules and regulation.  
Following the election of a right-wing coalition in the fall of 1991, the large 
compulsory school choice reform that is studied in this paper was implemented in the 
autumn of 1992. The reform had two parts: first it opened up for attending another 
public school than the one in the catchment area, and second, it allowed for privately 
run but publicly funded schools to operate alongside the ordinary public schools. In 
1994, the law was amended by also allowing for choice among public schools outside of 
the home municipality, which was previously only possible in very special cases.
14
 If 
the demand for a given public school exceeded the number of available slots, priority 
was given to students living in the catchment area. Private schools were not allowed to 
select their students on the basis of ability or other characteristics but only on a first-
come-first-served basis.
15
 
The reform has had substantial effects on the workings of the educational sector, at 
least in more urban areas. Before the reform, students were, with few exceptions, 
                                                 
12 From the year 1997 on, the vast majority of children also attend a voluntary 1-year school preparatory year, which 
is usually offered at the compulsory school. 
13 The central government grants have been completely general since 1993, i.e. not tied to specific sectors, and they 
are set so as to compensate for differences in tax base as well as in structural costs, in order to ensure that all 
municipalities have roughly equal economic conditions. Between 1991–1993, a sector specific grants system was in 
place, and before that, when the central government was responsible for the provision of education, central 
government grants were classified for different purposes. The largest among these, the “basic resource”, consisted 
mainly of teacher salaries (see pp. 67f von Greiff (2009)).  
14 See Law 1985:100  Chapter 4 §8a. 
15 Sibling priority, geographical proximity, or having attended a school run by the same provider, are also valid 
selection criteria. 
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referred to the school of their catchment area. Some alternative schools existed, such as 
Waldorf schools or schools with a special profile, like music, but they were rare. After 
the 1992 reform, as more and more private schools were established and as choice 
between the already existing schools became more and more common, this gradually 
changed, and now, 20 years after the reform, school choice is a normal phenomenon in 
many parts of the country. According to the National Board of Education
16
, almost 13 
per cent of all students in compulsory school attended an independent school in the 
school year 2011/12. For the public schools, there is no comprehensive information 
available on how common it is to choose another school than the catchment area school, 
but survey information from school year 2000/01 suggests that choosing another public 
school is at least as common as choosing a private school (The National Board of 
Education (2003)). 
For the sake of the empirical analysis, it is worth to point out that the expansion of 
choice both in terms of private schools, and in terms of choice between the public 
schools, has been gradual: in the mid 1990s, a couple of years after the reform, choosing 
another school than the default school was still rare (see the National Board of 
Education (1996)). This means that we expect the choice reform to have more and more 
of an impact over time, something that we will take into account in the empirical 
analysis. 
3 Why may effects differ across groups of 
students? 
This section will discuss theoretical arguments for why there might be heterogeneous 
effects for children with different socio-economic or migration backgrounds. We choose 
to focus especially on groups that may be considered more vulnerable or disadvantaged 
since the effects of school choice policies on these groups are often of particular interest 
in the public debate. In particular, we will focus on students with low-educated parents, 
defined as both parents having at most a compulsory education degree; students living 
                                                 
16 See information at the webpage of the National Board of Education: http://www.skolverket.se/statistik-och-
analys/2.1862/2.4290/2.4292.  
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in a low income household, defined as disposable household income being in the lowest 
quartile of the income distribution; students with both parents having been born outside 
of Sweden; and students living in high-crime areas.
17
 Each of these groups will be 
compared with their respective counterpart. 
Before we turn to why the effects of school choice would be expected to differ across 
groups of students, we briefly outline the channels through which free school choice 
might affect educational outcomes in general.
18
 First, being able to choose a school that 
suits one’s preferences and character may result in a better match between students and 
schools, which would improve learning among those who actively make a choice. 
Second, more choice for students, and schools budgets being tied in some way to the 
number of students, may introduce competitive pressure and lead head masters and 
teachers to increase teaching quality in order to attract students to their school
19
. This 
may lead to good schools attracting more students, and bad schools either improving or 
having to close down. Thereby, the overall quality of the education system may increase 
in the long-run, which would then be beneficial also for students who do not make an 
active school choice. Third, when students are free to attend another school than the one 
of the catchment area, the composition of students within a school may change, which 
results in different peer effects
20
. 
However, to what extent these channels work in reality is not clear, as they are 
related to a number of issues. One of them is the informational asymmetry between 
parents and schools, as the former may not always be able to observe educational 
quality or base their choices solely on this. Moreover, transportation costs to different 
schools and capacity limits of schools may decrease the forces of the above explained 
channels. Also, parents with different characteristics may react differently to the choice 
reform, both in their propensity to make an active school choice and the characteristics 
on which they base their choice. As a result, children with different background may be 
                                                 
17 See Section 4.2 for a closer definition. 
18 WEF13 presents a more detailed discussion. 
19 See for example Hoxby (2003) on the relation between school choice and school productivity. 
20 See for example Epple and Romano (1998) on this issue, who model peer effects of sorting as a results of school 
choice. See also De Giorgio et al (2009) for a study on the effects of class composition. 
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affected differently by the choice reform. In the following, we will discuss potential 
reasons for such differences for the subgroups that we analyse in this study.  
We organise our thoughts on this matter by asking: how do we expect that students 
reacted to and were affected by the expanding possibilities to choose school after the 
Swedish choice reform of 1992? 
First of all, we expect that some students reacted by choosing another school than the 
default school. Some may have chosen to attend another public school than the one of 
their catchment area, while others may have chosen a private school.
21
 Survey 
information from the National Board of Education (2003) suggests that making an 
active school choice (in Sweden in school year 2000/01) was more common among 
students whose parents had higher education or were immigrants. One can also 
speculate that the possibility of choosing another than the closest school might be more 
interesting for students of low-income background, as these may be financially 
restricted from getting into a good school by moving near it, i.e. from exerting Tiebout 
choice. Students from high-income families, on the other hand, have always had better 
economic means to move near the desired school, and might thus not have been as 
restricted in their school choice by the assignment system that was in place before the 
reform. A related hypothesis is that students living in more disadvantaged areas may be 
more likely to choose another school than the neighbourhood school, for example to get 
access to a school with less social problems. Students of different socio-economic or 
immigrant background, or students living in areas with more or less social problems, 
may hence differ in the likelihood of choosing another school than the default school. 
Second, those who make use of the option to attend another school than the default 
one, will naturally be subject to another school environment, including other teachers 
and peers, than would otherwise have been the case.
22
 How the new school differs from 
the old one in turn depends on the factors that determined the choice of school. Burgess 
et al. (2009) show that families in Britain do not only value academic performance 
when they choose schools, but also other factors such as the student composition and 
                                                 
21 See for example Nechyba (2006) for an overview of the literature on the mechanisms of sorting of students with 
respect to income and peer quality. 
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travel distance. The results of Hastings et al. (2006), who study U.S. families, 
furthermore suggest that getting access to the most desired school has positive effects 
on student outcomes only for those who named academic quality as an important choice 
factor. In addition, Hastings and Weinstein (2008) find that the likelihood of choosing a 
high-performing school was increased when low-income families were given 
information about school test scores. This suggests that, at least in the U.S., parents 
from low- and middle-income families did not have sufficient information on the 
quality of the school, since providing such information changed their choice of school 
towards educationally better schools. Hastings and Weinstein (2008) also find a positive 
effect on student test scores of attending a higher-scoring school.  
The results of these studies illustrate that, in order to benefit from the option to 
choose a school, it is important to have and use information about factors that actually 
are important for students’ school results, such as academic quality. This means that 
even though all students may make an active school choice, the factors influencing this 
choice may be very different, which may in turn lead to heterogeneous effects of school 
choice. For the Swedish case, Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007) provide some evidence that 
parents with higher education and those born in another country were more likely to 
send their children to a private school, while they find no such difference with regard to 
parental income. This might in turn lead to different effects for the corresponding 
subgroups if attending a private school is on average more or less beneficial than 
attending a public school
23
. 
Third, not only the students who make an active school choice may be affected by 
increased choice possibilities, but also the students who remain in the default school. 
That is, they may be affected by the other students’ choices if the characteristics of the 
peer group change and, in relative terms, by possibly staying at a not so good school 
that other students opted to leave. In their study, Östh, Andersson and Malmberg (2010) 
suggest that school choice in Sweden has led to increased between-school dispersion in 
                                                                                                                                               
22 See Sacerdote (2011) for a recent survey of the empirical literature on peer effects. See also De Giorgi and 
Pellizzari (2011) for a study on peer effects which models and tests for different mechanisms of peer interactions. 
23 Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007) find some evidence for a beneficial effect of attending a private school, though they 
also show that most of their estimated positive effects of higher private school shares stems from the competition 
effects that affect all pupils, not just those in private schools. 
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9
th
 grade marks, on top of the dispersion that stems from residential segregation. 
Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007), who also study the 1992 choice reforms but focus on the 
introduction of private schools, find that a higher share of private school students within 
a municipality is related to higher segregation in terms of parental education and 
immigrant status between public and private schools. Comparing schools offering 
grades 7-9 in the years before and after the reform, we do not find any indication for an 
overall increase in segregation, measured in terms of the between-school variation in the 
share of students with a disadvantaged socio-economic background or immigrant 
background (see Section 8.1.1 in the appendix).  This measure does however not 
disentangle the effects of the choice reform from other factors that changed over time 
and thus does not show that the choice reform has not increased segregation. 
In sum, given that previous studies have indicated systematic differences in the way 
that students of different background react to reforms that expand school choice, and 
given the many channels through which school choice may affect student outcomes, it is 
important to test empirically whether the effect of the Swedish 1992 school choice 
reform differs across groups of students, and in particular, whether some groups were 
harmed by school choice as it evolved after the reform. 
4 Data and descriptive statistics 
Before we turn to the econometric analysis, we will check, in this section, if there is 
any indication in our data that students of different background reacted differently to the 
choice reform. To this end, we look at descriptive statistics for student outcomes as well 
as at indicators of actual school choices made, namely travel distance to school and 
attending a private versus public school. First however, the subsection below gives a 
short overview of the data sources. 
4.1 Data 
This study uses the same data set as employed in the companion paper; the following 
section thus heavily builds on the corresponding one in WEF13. We use data from 
Statistics Sweden, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, the Military 
Archives and the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency. The data set contains 
 12 
 
information on final grades from compulsory school for all individuals in Sweden born 
in 1972–1990, and on the longer term outcomes “criminal convictions by age 22”, 
“university education at age 25” and “employment at age 25” for those who had 
achieved the corresponding age by 2009. For men, we also observe the cognitive score 
from the military draft test
2425
. The data furthermore include a broad set of individual 
level background variables, including detailed parental background information on 
education and income level, country of birth and family structure. In addition, we have 
access to geographical information on the location of schools (for years 1988–2006) and 
students’ residences (for years 1985–2006), measured as 100*100 square meter boxes. 
These data allow us to construct detailed measures of the choice options available to 
each student. 
Moreover, we have information on a set of municipality level characteristics like the 
population density and income tax base which we collected from the webpage of 
Statistics Sweden (www.scb.se) and from the webpage of the Swedish Association of 
Local Authorities and Regions (www.skl.se). On a finer regional level, we constructed a 
set of parish level characteristics from individual register data, including population 
density, education and income level and immigrant share. A full list of these variables, 
used as covariates in the estimations, is given below Table 5. Table 25 displays the 
corresponding descriptive statistics. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows average student outcomes separately for the pre- and post-reform 
cohorts, that is for cohorts born between 1972 and 1976, and between 1977 and 1990, 
respectively, and separately for the different subgroups
26
. We can see that the higher the 
household income and parental education, the better is the average value of most 
outcomes, that is of the percentile rank in marks, cognitive skills, the share receiving a 
passing or a high grade in math or holding a university degree at age 25, and having 
                                                 
24 See also Lindqvist and Vestman (2011) for a detailed description of this test. Note that the share of men taking the 
military test drops significantly for the younger cohorts. See WEF13 for an analysis showing that the selection effects 
are only mildly related to our choice measure and outcomes, on average. 
25 The cognitive score and information on whether the individual has been convicted for a crime are available only for 
cohorts born in 1972 to 1987, while the information on university education and employment, measured at age 25, is 
only available for individuals born between 1972 and 1984. 
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been convicted for a crime until age 22. A similar pattern holds when comparing 
children whose parents have both been born abroad with those who have at least one 
native Swedish parent. Comparing these numbers pre- and post-reform, the most 
remarkable changes are the increase in the percentage receiving a passing grade in all 
subgroups
27
 and the increase in the share of those having obtained a university degree at 
age 25. Both of these changes are more pronounced among children with high compared 
to low-educated parents and immigrants as compared to native Swedes. The change in 
obtaining a university degree at age 25 is with 10 percentage points twice as large for 
children of high-income as compared to low-income families. Apart from this, students 
from middle and high income households have similar or improved outcomes in all 
dimensions except for the share of those being employed at age 25, while students from 
low-income families have similar outcomes and a slight decrease in the probability of 
receiving a high grade in math at the end of 9
th
 grade. Children from parents who both 
have at most a compulsory education experience a decrease in the percentile rank in 
marks by 2 percentage points and an increase in the share having committed a crime 
until age 22 by 1.5 percentage points. 
Lastly, we split the sample according to the local crime rate in 1990–91. We think 
that this is an interesting additional characteristic since, as was discussed in Section 3, 
school choice gives students of areas with social problems the possibility of leaving 
their neighbourhood for the time they are at school and to get in touch with other peers. 
If, for some reason, their families were stuck in a neighbourhood with high crime and 
potentially bad influences while growing up, being given the opportunity of going to a 
school outside of this neighbourhood might be especially beneficial.  
In order to analyse empirically whether this is the case, we split the sample according 
to whether the student’s home municipality or, for the larger municipalities, parish, had 
                                                                                                                                               
26 The corresponding standard deviation and number of observations are reported in tables in Section 8.1.7.1. 
27 This is in line with Vlachos (2010) who finds that the final average grade point averages from Swedish lower as 
well as upper secondary school increased between 1998 and 2008. Vlachos’ analysis contributes only a small share of 
this increase to competition effects, and suggests that a large share can rather be attributed to other factors such as the 
introduction of a new grading system in 1997, based on absolute knowledge goals, instead of the previous more 
relative grading system. In WEF13, we find that there is, on average, a modest increase in the percentile rank of 9th 
grade GPA as a result of having more school choice. We further present suggestive evidence that this is not explained 
by grade inflation only. 
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a crime rate in the top quartile of the distribution both in 1990 and 1991, or not.
28
 We 
use the crime rate among 15-18-year-olds, as this is likely to be more important in terms 
of influences on adolescents than the adult crime rate.  
 
Table 1: Pre- and post-reform averages of student outcomes for different subgroups 
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household income is… 
low income Pre 40.87 0.713 0.308 4.72 0.204 0.244 0.678 
 Post 40.55 0.835 0.294 4.64 0.203 0.292 0.671 
medium income Pre 47.59 0.773 0.356 4.98 0.147 0.331 0.729 
 Post 48.11 0.885 0.370 4.92 0.134 0.389 0.714 
high income Pre 55.92 0.821 0.429 5.50 0.129 0.472 0.695 
 Post 59.82 0.929 0.511 5.60 0.104 0.576 0.654 
parents highest educational degree is … education 
compulsory Pre 36.37 0.684 0.275 4.14 0.186 0.159 0.740 
 Post 34.01 0.763 0.220 4.00 0.201 0.191 0.728 
more than 
compulsory 
Pre 50.34 0.788 0.380 5.22 0.150 0.381 0.702 
Post 50.68 0.895 0.403 5.14 0.137 0.440 0.684 
parents are… 
both immigrants Pre 43.00 0.686 0.276 4.20 0.242 0.249 0.631 
 Post 44.42 0.824 0.304 4.20 0.226 0.346 0.607 
at least one 
Swedish  
Pre 48.52 0.777 0.369 5.10 0.150 0.353 0.713 
Post 49.78 0.889 0.396 5.10 0.136 0.420 0.695 
Residential area 1990–91… 
high crime Pre 46.99 0.741 0.338 4.89 0.197 0.306 0.684 
 Post 49.46 0.871 0.382 4.93 0.170 0.387 0.666 
low/ medium  Pre 48.41 0.777 0.369 5.09 0.148 0.354 0.712 
crime Post 49.41 0.887 0.391 5.06 0.138 0.419 0.693 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 5. 
                                                 
28 The high crime areas are defined as the local areas that were in the top quarter of the distribution of youth crime in 
both 1990 and 1991, and where youth crime is measured as the share of 15–18-year-olds that were convicted for a 
crime during the year. (The reason for using both 1990 and 1991 to determine high crime areas is to get a more stable 
measure.) As local area, we used the municipality of residence, measured in 1991, in the cases where the municipality 
population was less than 50 000. For larger municipalities, we deemed the municipality to be too large to constitute a 
relevant local unit and instead used the parish level information. Finally, in many cases the resulting parishes were 
too small to be meaningful and we then merged several geographically adjacent parishes to one unit. For more 
detailed information on this procedure, please contact the authors. 
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Table 2 displays which kinds of crimes are most commonly committed in high vs. 
low or medium crime areas in 1991. Listing only those crimes that make up more than 3 
per cent of all crimes, we can see that the composition of crimes in low/medium and 
high-crime areas is very similar, so it is mostly the quantity that varies: the average 
crime rate in the high crime municipalities is 6.1 per cent, while it is only 3.7 per cent in 
the low and medium level crime areas. 
The last rows in Table 1 display that there are no strong differences in outcomes of 
students living in the different areas, except that the share of those having committed a 
crime until age 22 is higher in high crime areas and that the share holding a university 
degree at age 25 and those receiving a passing or a high grade is slightly lower for pre-
reform cohorts in these areas. However, after the reform, students in high crime areas 
perform slightly better in terms of marks compared to students in low or medium crime 
areas. 
 
Table 2: High crime areas based on criminal convictions of individuals aged 15-18 years in 
year 1990 and 1991. 
 type of crime high crime low or medium crime 
Assault  6.2 5.8 
Illegal driving 13.7 17.48 
Drunk driving <3% 3.72 
Reckless driving <3% 3.41 
Damage 5.44 5.48 
Petty theft /pilfering 16.31 15.05 
Theft 18.67 17.04 
Car/ bike theft 6.98 5.95 
   
Average crime rate 6.11% 3.68% 
Number 50 320 
Note: High crime refers to areas that have a criminal conviction rate among 15-18-year-olds that is in the 
upper quartile in both 1990 and 1991. “Low or medium crime” refers to the complementary group. Local 
areas are defined as the municipality for municipalities with a population below 50 000, and is defined as 
the parish or a set of adjacent parishes, for municipalities with a population at or above 50 000. 
 
These descriptive comparisons of subpopulations and cohorts that have been affected 
and not affected by the reform show that children from low-income and less educated 
households experienced, for some outcomes, a small relative drop after the reform 
compared to more advantaged students. Before we turn to an econometric assessment of 
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whether these differences are related to the school choice reform, we first investigate in 
the next section whether there is any indication in the data that students from different 
subgroups changed their school choice behaviour in different ways after the reform. 
4.3 Differences in choice behaviour of students with different 
background 
In this section we investigate whether students of a different socio-economic or 
immigrant background reacted differently to the choice reform in terms of making an 
active school choice. As we lack information on whether students choose to attend 
another public school than the assigned one, we instead make use of indirect 
information in terms of distance to school of attendance and whether students attend a 
private or public school, to get an idea of how the choice reform affected school choice-
related behaviour.  
The travel distance to school can be seen as an approximate indicator of school 
choice in general – to public as well as private schools, since students that opt out of the 
school of their catchment area are likely to increase their travel distance, as the 
catchment area school is in general the nearest one. With new schools opening up and 
old ones possibly closing down, an increased travel distance is not a perfect measure of 
choosing another than the default school but only an approximation. Moreover, any 
changes in travel distance over time may of course be related to other factors and 
general trends too. On the contrary, attending a private school is clear evidence for 
active school choice, as opting out of the public school system requires parents to act. 
Columns 1-4 in Table 3 show the mean of the travel distance to school for the 
different subgroups, separately for the pre- and post-reform cohorts.29 The first two 
columns show the unconditional mean, while the last two columns show the mean 
conditional on all covariates included in the estimation30, i.e. net of all differences in 
covariates. The numbers for the cohorts not affected by the reform indicate that the 
unconditional mean travel distance to school was larger among low-income than among 
                                                 
29 Note that we measure travel distance “as the crow flies”, i.e. by computing the distance between the mid points of 
the coordinate for the students home and the students’ school of attendance in 9th grade. 
30 This is calculated using coefficient estimates from an OLS regression with distance to school as the outcome and 
all covariates, an indicator for „affected by the reform“, an indicator for the subgroup and an interaction of the two 
included as right hand side variables. 
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mid- and high-income households, and was larger among households with Swedish-
born parents or households living in high-crime areas. However, conditioning on 
covariates (Columns 3 and 4) almost completely eliminates these differences except for 
households with different incomes. When we compare the conditional pre- and post-
reform means, we see that the distance to school increases over time for all groups, but 
the increase is largest, both for the unconditional and the conditional means, for low-
income households. We furthermore see that the conditional travel distance increases a 
bit more between the pre- and post-reform cohorts if both parents are Swedish-born 
parents or if the child lives in a high crime area.  
Columns 5–6 in Table 3 show the unconditional and conditional share of students 
attending a private school in 9
th
 grade. Here, we only report the shares for post-reform 
cohorts, as it was extremely uncommon to attend a private school before the reform. 
The unconditional means in the fifth column of Table 3 show that children of 
immigrant, higher-education and higher-income background, as well as children from 
high crime areas, are more likely to attend a private school. When conditioning on all 
covariates that we use in the main estimations (see note to Table 5 for a list), the 
differences with respect to household income are negligible, while the qualitative results 
for the other subgroups stay the same. 
In sum, the descriptive statistics suggest that travel distances have increased for all 
groups after the choice reform, but the increase is larger for students whose parents have 
lower income, who live in high crime municipalities or have Swedish-born parents, 
which in turn could suggest that choosing another school than the catchment area school 
after the reform was more common among these groups of students. Of course, when 
interpreting these purely descriptive statistics it has to be kept in mind that other factors 
like trends in living in different residential areas and not school choice itself may be 
behind these results. Our data on private school attendance furthermore shows that 
private school attendance was more common among students of immigrant background, 
students in high-crime areas or students with high-educated parents.  
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Table 3: Mean travel distance and the share attending a private school for different 
subgroups 
  DISTANCE TO SCHOOL ATTENDING A PRIVATE SCHOOL 
 
 unconditional 
conditional on 
all covariates unconditional 
conditional on 
all covariates 
   
pre-
reform 
cohorts 
post-
reform 
cohorts 
pre-
reform 
cohorts 
post-
reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
household income:  
low income mean 8.27 8.74 6.54 7.61 0.035 0.038 
 Sd 39.71 41.07   0.184  
medium income mean 5.99 6.07 5.62 6.26 0.029 0.036 
 Sd 26.79 26.18   0.168  
high income mean 6.11 5.86 6.65 7.06 0.054 0.039 
 Sd 32.60 30.48   0.226  
parents highest educational degree is … schooling  
compulsory  mean 6.51 6.78 5.58 6.48 0.017 0.020 
 Sd 26.36 29.04   0.128  
more than  Mean 6.55 6.63 6.18 6.81 0.039 0.038 
 compulsory Sd 32.56 31.55   0.193  
parents are...         
both Immigrants Mean 5.64 5.37 6.36 6.53 0.059 0.053 
 Sd 40.52 35.16   0.236  
at least one  Mean 6.60 6.74 6.10 6.80 0.035 0.036 
 Swedish Sd 31.10 31.05   0.185  
local area in 1990–91 is…       
high crime Mean 5.47 5.57 5.77 7.34 0.057 0.037 
 Sd 36.31 34.04   0.231  
low or medium  Mean 6.79 6.89 5.69 6.89 0.034 0.038 
crime Sd 30.87 30.96   0.180  
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 5 
and for whom we observe at least one outcome. 
 
As outlined in Section 3, there are several channels through which the reform may 
affect both those students who make active choices and those who do not; however, a 
reasonable hypothesis is that the former group will be more affected. Different choice 
patterns between groups of students could therefore lead us to think that the reform 
effect may differ across groups. Böhlmark and Lindahl (2012), who study the expansion 
of private school attendance, present evidence that one advantage of competition by 
private schools is an increase in the outcomes of students attending private schools, 
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although they show that most of the benefits affect all students, that is also those 
attending a public school.  
With these patterns in mind, we turn to the main empirical analysis of the study. 
5 Empirical strategy 
5.1 Identification 
We follow the identification strategy used in the companion paper, where we identify 
the average effects of the reform (see WEF13). Identifying the effect of more school 
choice as introduced by the reform in 1992 mainly faces two empirical challenges.  
The first is the endogenous choice of residence and location of families and schools 
following the choice reform. After the reform was introduced, many new private 
schools opened up, and it is highly plausible that neither the for-profit nor the non-for-
profit private schools chose their location of business at random. Both cream-skimming 
arguments as well as motives to help especially disadvantaged children might have 
influenced the decision where to open a new school. At the same time, if more choice 
and competition leads to an improved quality of education, parents that are very 
concerned about their children’s education will try to move close to such competitive 
areas in order to have a higher likelihood to get into one of these schools and in order to 
face short travel distances.  
Not taking these arguments into account in the estimation might lead to either a 
positive or a negative bias of the effect of having more schools nearby, depending on 
which of the mechanisms is more important empirically. We solve this issue by using 
the location of families’ residences and the location of schools in 1991, that is, right 
before the reform, to calculate our choice measure for those students who choose a 
school after 1992, i.e. those who are affected by the reform. Since the reform came as a 
surprise, in the sense that it was introduced by the new governing coalition that won the 
tight 1991 parliamentary election
31
, we can take the pre-reform locations to be 
                                                 
31 The right wing coalition (Moderaterna; Folkpartiet; Centerpartiet; and Kristdemokraterna) obtained 46.6% of votes, 
and the socialist block (The Social Democrats and the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet)) 42.2%. New Democracy, which 
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exogenous to the reform. To illustrate this approach, take a student born in the year 
1983 who, correspondingly, chose a school to start seventh grade in 1996. As this was 
after the reform, the number of schools around the students’ home could be related to 
her underlying ability, due to the endogenous location of both schools and students after 
the choice reform. As discussed above, in order to avoid this, we count the number of 
schools close to the students’ residential location in the year 1991. For a student born in 
1973, who started seventh grade a decade earlier and left compulsory schooling in 1989, 
the number of schools close-by cannot have been related to her underlying ability via 
free school choice as this did not yet exist
32
. Hence, without risking an endogeneity bias 
caused by reactions to the reform, we count the number of schools around the students’ 
home in 1986, the year in which the student actually chooses a school.  
An additional advantage of using measures that were predetermined is that we have a 
natural starting point from where dynamic competition effects started to evolve. To 
illuminate this, suppose a child lives close to very many schools right before the 
introduction of the reform. Once the new rules are in place, the schools start competing 
for students, new schools may open up and old, bad schools may close down. If the 
competitive process is strong enough, we might see more and more schools closing 
down and the best ones attracting more and more students. Some years later, we would 
then see a rather monopolistic situation, with few schools, but possibly very good 
outcomes, if only the best schools have sustained in the competition. Relating the 
number of schools to student outcomes at that later time would then show no, weak, or 
even a negative relationship between choice opportunities and student performance. It is 
thus difficult to compare contemporaneous choice measures to student outcomes when 
it is not clear at which stage of a dynamic process this is observed. Using predetermined 
measures of school choice as they are observed at the start of the competitive process, in 
contrast, will incorporate the dynamic changes, like opening or closing of schools, that 
are a direct result of the initial choice setting.
 
                                                                                                                                               
has since then disappeared from politics, obtained 6.7% of the votes, and The greens, Miljöpartiet, received 3.7% of 
the votes and were hence only 0.3% from parliamentary representation. 
32 It may have been related to ability because of other factors, like Tiebout migration or the correlation between 
average educational level and density of schools in an area. This is what we refer to as the second challenge to 
identification and will be described later on in this section. 
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Needless to say, the pre-reform situation will not remain a relevant measure forever – 
eventually other changes will take place so that the pre-reform situation does no longer 
measure the relevant conditions forming choice and competition. However, we believe 
that the 12-year period that we study constitutes a reasonable time frame for this type of 
analysis. Moreover, we observe in the data that there is a fairly close correlation 
between the choice index as measured just before the reform and the one measured at 
the time the individuals make their decision among all subgroups (see Section 8.1.2 in 
the appendix). 
The second challenge to identification is that having more schools nearby to choose 
from will be correlated with several other factors that might be related to student 
outcomes, such as living in a more urban neighbourhood, populated, for example, by 
people with different education backgrounds than people living in rural areas. Even 
though we observe a broad set of individual, municipality level and parish level 
characteristics, it is hard to argue that every possible confounding factor is captured by 
these variables. Therefore, in addition to controlling for these variables in our 
estimation, we will also control for the effect that having many schools close-by has had 
before the reform. We achieve this by including cohorts that are not affected by the 
reform in our analysis and estimating only the differential effect of choice for affected 
as compared to non-affected cohorts. We will thus net out any potential effect, or 
spurious correlation, that is related to having many schools in the neighbourhood in a 
situation where parents cannot choose the school they send their child to. Consequently, 
our analysis will capture the additional effect of being able to choose more freely 
among schools, as it was introduced by the Swedish school choice reform. 
Our identifying assumption is thus that, if the reform had not been implemented, the 
relationship between our choice measure and students’ outcomes would have been the 
same as it was in the years before the reform. Even though this assumption cannot be 
tested empirically, we can test its credibility by performing placebo estimates. To this 
end, we artificially change the date of the reform to having been enacted two years 
earlier and test whether we find any treatment effect of this non-existent reform. If that 
is the case, it shows us that the relation between our choice measure and student 
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outcomes, given our covariates, has already changed before the reform, making an 
identification of the reform effect difficult.  
5.2 Measuring the degree of choice  
This paper will use the same measure for school choice as was used in WEF13. The 
following section is thus based on the corresponding section in that companion paper.  
In order to be able to benefit from the introduction of school choice, it is essential for 
students to have access to schools close to their home. We thus measure school choice 
by counting the number of schools that students can potentially choose from
33
 within 
the proximity of their homes, using the median commuting distance of the home 
municipality in 1991
34
 as radius and, alternatively, a radius of 2km
35
. The median value 
of the municipality-specific median commuting distances is about 5km. Using the 
commuting distance of the home municipality in 1991 as radius around students’ homes 
has the advantage of flexibly taking into account the large geographical diversity of 
Sweden. Nevertheless, we also use a radius of 2km around a student’s home to examine 
the robustness of the results.
36
 It shall be noted that these two measures will have a 
different bite in measuring the number of available schools in different regions: while 
there are often no schools within 2km in rural areas, and this measure therefore does not 
capture much of the variation in the number of accessible schools there, there will be 
very many schools in this radius in the big cities such as Stockholm.  
In line with previous studies on the Swedish choice reform and WEF13, we focus on 
analysing choice opportunities for children when they start 7
th
 grade. This is an 
important stage of compulsory education as grades at the end of 9
th
 grade are important 
for admission into upper secondary school. Thus, this is a point in time when parents are 
likely to be interested in choosing a good school. It is also a time when making a school 
choice is likely to be relevant, since it marks the start of lower secondary school, which 
is often organised in a separate school from lower education. When calculating our 
                                                 
33 See Section 2 for more detailed information on which schools a student could choose from. 
34 We are grateful to John Östh for providing information on municipality commuting distances, which are measured 
“as the crow flies”, and do not take into account the directions of roads and the like.” 
35 See also Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2008), Himmler (2009) and Noailly, Vujic and Aouragh (2009) for other 
studies using the distance between a student’s home and schools. 
36 We also estimated the regressions using the radii 3, 4, 5, and 10 km, see Section 6.3. 
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choice measure, we thus use the location of residence of students when they are 13 
years old and count the number of schools that offer grades 7-9 close to their home
37
. 
As explained in the last section, for students born in cohorts 1979-1990, that is those 
who chose a school for grades 7-9 after the 1992 reform, we use the place of residence 
in 1991 and the schools that were present at that time in order to calculate the pre-
reform choice measures. Moreover, as we only have geographical information on 
schools starting from year 1988, we use the 1988 location of schools also for students 
who started grade 7 before that. 
Table 4 shows the mean and standard deviation for the pre-reform choice measures 
which count the number of schools within the median commuting distance, and within 
2km, separately for the different subgroups and for pre- and post-reform cohorts. The 
number of schools within the median commuting and 2km radius is similar for students 
in the lowest and highest income quartile, but is smaller for those living in households 
with an income between the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of the distribution. For the post-
reform cohorts, the choice measures are somewhat larger for the highest income 
households, also when compared to those with the lowest income. Note though, that this 
does not show an increase in the number of schools, since the value is measured in 
1991, but rather a possible change in residence patterns already before 1991, or the 
consequences of the law change in 1994 that opened up for choice to public schools in 
other municipalities38. Dividing the sample along the educational background of the 
parents, we see that low educated households have slightly less schools within the 
municipalities’ median commuting distance around their home, but very similar 
numbers when counting schools within 2km around the home. Furthermore, children 
with parents that were both born outside of Sweden have more schools nearby on 
average than children with at least one Swedish-born parent. Lastly, when dividing the 
sample according to the municipal crime rate in 1991, we can see that students in pre- as 
well as post-reform cohorts living in high crime areas in 1991 had more schools nearby 
on average. 
                                                 
37 Measures calculated for the choice options at first and fourth grade are highly correlated with the choice measure 
for grades 7-9. 
38 See Law 1985:100, Chapter 4 §8a. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics on choice measures for different subgroups 
      
  
           NUMBER OF SCHOOLS WITHIN.. 
 
  ..median commuting distance ..2km 
    
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
household income:      
low income mean 3.847 6.112 1.43 1.503 
 sd 5.169 9.273 1.662 1.783 
medium income mean 2.930 4.879 1.118 1.198 
 sd 4.187 8.440 1.400 1.565 
high income mean 4.136 7.754 1.328 1.510 
  sd 4.941 10.73 1.514 1.805 
parents highest educational degree is ... schooling    
compulsory mean 2.850 5.172 1.138 1.333 
 sd 4.076 8.374 1.443 1.610 
more than compulsory mean 3.565 5.976 1.264 1.352 
  sd 4.753 9.430 1.509 1.696 
parents are…      
both Immigrants mean 6.008 10.11 2.169 2.405 
 sd 5.239 10.27 1.734 1.814 
at least one Swedish mean 3.299 5.582 1.188 1.267 
  sd 4.579 9.197 1.466 1.651 
Residential area in 1990–91     
high crime mean 7.806 11.10 2.426 2.764 
 sd 7.187 9.710 1.971 2.144 
low or medium crime mean 2.628 4.963 1.028 1.080 
  Sd 3.499 9.025 1.290 1.435 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 5 
and for whom we observe at least one outcome. 
 
5.3 Estimation 
The estimation strategy used in this study follows the one applied in the companion 
paper (WEF13). In order to investigate whether students of different background were 
differently affected by the 1991 choice reform, we run regressions separately for the 
different subpopulations. Moreover, to estimate the differential effect of school choice 
and how it evolves over time for cohorts affected by the reform, as compared to the 
effect of having many schools nearby for unaffected cohorts, we pool all cohorts and 
define the following treatment window dummy variables: 
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(1) 
1
2
3
4
5
1 1977 1978;
1 1979 1980 1981;
1 1982 1983 1984;
1 1985 1986 1987;
1 1988 1989 1990;
i
i
i
i
i
D if born in or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero




 otherwise
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the pre-reform cohorts, all these treatment dummies are zero. The choice of these 
windows follows the degree to which students born in the different cohorts were 
potentially affected by the reform (see also Figure 1): Those born in 1977 started 9
th
 
grade in 1992 and could in theory be affected by the choice-reform either through 
increased competitive pressure on schools, or through the option of switching school, 
during their last year of compulsory schooling. Although we would not expect any large 
effects after such a short time period, we allocate them into a separate group as they are 
not a clear control group. Cohorts 1979-1981 started 7
th
 grade in or after 1992, when the 
choice reform was in place, and could hence in principle choose the school they wanted 
to attend for the final stage in compulsory education. The next treatment window 
dummy, 3iD , captures all cohorts that were affected by the reform, and could hence in 
principle make a school choice already for classes 4-6 and 7-9. Finally, for cohorts 
included in treatment windows 4iD  and 
5
iD , the choice reform was in place throughout 
their educational career, meaning that they could benefit from more choice in general, 
but also that the reform had already been in place some years when they entered grade 
7, and thus, that competition had already had time to evolve. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
year of birth 
1973               1977     1979            1982           1985           1988 
start grade 7 after reform 
start grade 4 after reform 
 
start grade 1 after reform 
 
D
1
 D
2
 D
3
 
 
D
4
 
 
D
5
 
 
Figure 1: Treated cohorts 
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By interacting these dummies with our choice measure, the coefficient corresponding to 
each “ choicewindowtreatment   ” interaction term will measure the differential effect of 
having many schools nearby after the reform, for students in the respective windows. 
We thus estimate the following equation, separately for each subpopulation of interest: 
(2)  
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5i i i i i i i i i i i i cohort municipality i iY D c D c D c D c D c c X u                     
where cohort  and municipality  are cohort and municipality fixed-effects and X is a vector of 
covariates including a wide range of individual, municipal and parish level 
characteristics (a full list is given below Table 5).
39
 We use OLS for continuous 
outcomes and Probit for binary outcomes, and cluster standard errors at the school-
cohort level.
40
 
The  -coefficients measure the differential impact of having many schools nearby 
for cohorts in the respective treatment windows, compared to cohorts that were 
unaffected by the reform. Thus, they measure the effect of school choice as introduced 
by the reform. The coefficient   captures any relation between living near many 
schools and the outcome variable that existed already before the reform. By including 
ic , we control for the correlation between our choice-measure and the outcomes of the 
pre-reform cohorts.
41
 
As we use students’ and schools’ locations from 1991 for cohorts 1979-1990, we will 
also measure all municipal and parish- level covariates in 1991. For cohorts 1972-1978, 
we use the information from the year in which they start 7
th
 grade or, if this is not 
available due to data limitations, from the closest available date. 
                                                 
39 In a robustness section, in Section 6.3, we will also report the results from the estimation when we allow for the 
effect of the covariates X to vary between the treatment windows. 
40 We cannot link schools over time in our dataset; therefore, we cluster standard errors on the school level within 
each cohort. 
41 The estimate of   potentially includes effects of Tiebout school choice, or yardstick-type effects, due to it being 
easier to make comparisons of school performance, and hence put pressure on the own school to improve, if there are 
many schools around. Note, however, that we do not assume a causal interpretation of  . 
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6 Results 
As mentioned in the introduction, in the companion paper to this study (WEF13), we 
found only small effects of more school choice as introduced by the 1992 choice reform 
on the average percentile rank in marks. In this section, we will test whether the small 
average effects mask heterogeneous effects; first with respect to the distribution of 
marks, and then with respect to student background. 
6.1 Effects on the distribution of marks 
We start by analysing if the school choice reform affected the distribution of marks, 
more specifically, whether the effects differed at the important thresholds “receiving a 
passing grade” and “receiving a high grade”.42 For this analysis, we will focus on marks 
in mathematics at the end of 9
th
 grade, as we think that this subject is more suited for a 
comparison over time and between immigrants and Swedes than English and Swedish 
would be.  
Table 5 displays the marginal effects of an additional school nearby in 1991 on the 
probability of receiving a passing or high grade. The first two columns show results 
using the radius median commuting distance while the third and fourth display those 
using a 2km radius around a students’ home to count the number of schools. We can see 
that there is no effect on the probability of receiving a passing grade when using the 
median commuting distance. However, this result is not robust to using a radius of 2km.  
                                                 
42 The other outcomes that we have analysed in the companion paper refer to binary variables and, as such, are not 
interesting for a distributional analysis. The only exception to this is the cognitive score in the military test, which, 
however, only takes 9 values, making it less suitable for a distributional analysis. Moreover, it does not have such 
clear thresholds of interest as do grades. 
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Table 5: Effect on distribution of marks in 9th grade math 
CHOICE MEASURE: 
NUMBER OF SCHOOLS WITHIN RADIUS... 
.. MEDIAN COMMUTING 
DISTANCE 
.. 2KM 
Independent Variable 
receiving a 
passing 
grade 
receiving a 
high grade✝ 
receiving a 
passing  
grade 
receiving a        
high grade✝ 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for: 
Cohorts 1988--1990  0.000342 0.00312*** -0.00118* 0.00778*** 
(0.000278) (0.000350) (0.000695) (0.00106) 
Cohorts 1985--1987  0.000117 0.00248*** -0.0023*** 0.00486*** 
(0.000280) (0.000347) (0.000692) (0.00107) 
Cohorts 1982--1984  -4.84e-05 0.00163*** -0.00184*** 0.00120 
(0.000280) (0.000352) (0.000689) (0.00113) 
Cohorts 1979--1981  0.000503* 0.000618* 0.00198** -0.00254** 
(0.000300) (0.000366) (0.000951) (0.00113) 
Cohorts 1977--1978  -0.000268 -0.000195 -0.000726 -0.00221* 
(0.000388) (0.000440) (0.00113) (0.00132) 
Untreated Cohorts (1972--1976) -0.000156 -0.00132*** 0.00140** 0.000363 
(0.000282) (0.000338) (0.000651) (0.000798) 
     
Placebo test pass pass pass fail 
Observations 1,712,116 1,712,116 1,712,116 1,712,116 
R-squared 
‡
 0.134 0.0602 0.134 0.0601 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. The 
definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
✝For the outcome “receiving a high grade”, we left out household income and its squared term to achieve convergence.  
The following control variables are included in the estimation:  
On the municipality level: population density, taxable income and taxable income squared 
On the parish level: share of Swedish citizens among the 16-64-year-olds, mean earnings of the 20-64-year-olds, share of 
university graduates among the 20-64-year-olds, share of employed persons among the 20-64-year-olds, indicator variables 
for whether the population density of 7-15-year-olds is in the lowest or highest quartile across Sweden 
On the individual level: household income and household income squared, whether the household received welfare, age of 
the mother at birth, indicator for living in a single parent household, number of children in the household, indicator for only 
child, whether child was born in Sweden, indicator variables on mothers and fathers country of birth separately (Swedish, 
Nordic (=Norwegian, Finnish, Danish), from other western country(=Western Europe, North America, Australia), rest of 
the world is base category), indicator variables on whether mother and/or father graduated from university or secondary 
education. 
 
At the same time, we see an increase in the probability of achieving a high grade in 
math, for the later cohorts, by around 0.3 percentage points per additional school within 
the median commuting distance around a students’ home. A qualitatively similar pattern 
is found using the 2km radius. However, when performing a placebo test pretending the 
reform had happened two years earlier, we find a negative effect of the placebo-reform 
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that is statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence level, indicating that this 
result should not be over-interpreted as the identification is weak.  
Overall, we thus find some suggestive, though somewhat unstable, evidence that the 
distribution of marks spread out a little in response to the reform. We will further 
investigate these distributional effects in the next section, where we analyse whether 
students from a different social background were differently affected by the choice 
reform. 
6.2 Are students from a socio-economically disadvantaged or migration 
background harmed by the reform? 
6.2.1 Heterogeneity with respect to parental household income 
 
For the reasons explained in Section 3, theoretically it might be that children from 
low-income families benefit more – or less – than children from high-income families 
from the school choice reform.  
The first three columns of Table 6 display the effect on the percentile rank in 9
th
 
grade marks, estimated separately for low-, medium- and high-income households. In 
all household groups, the general pattern is that effects are negative for the early 
cohorts, even though mostly not statistically significantly different from zero, whereas 
for the later cohorts the effects are positive, larger and more often significant. This is in 
accordance with the results for the average effects in WEF13, as well as with the 
hypothesis that competitive pressure and realising choice options took some time to 
fully come into effect. The point estimates for the youngest cohorts are slightly larger 
for students from families with a lower household income. One additional school in the 
median commuting distance raises the percentile rank in 9
th
 grade marks by 0.2 points 
for students from the lowest income households, while the corresponding figure for 
medium and high income households is 0.13 and 0.1 respectively. The differences 
between the lowest and the two other income groups are mostly statistically 
significant
43
. As the standard deviation of the percentile rank is around 28, these effects 
are rather small, as are the differences between the groups in absolute terms. When 
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multiplying the effect by one standard deviation in the choice measure, which is 9.2 for 
the affected cohorts in the lowest income group, this implies an increase in the 
percentile rank by roughly 1.8 points. This is similar to the effect of an increase in the 
municipal private school share by 10 percentage points, found by Böhlmark and Lindahl 
(2012). However, the average number of schools within median commuting distance 
around the home for students affected by the reform and in the lowest income group is 
6.1, an increase by 9 schools would thus be very large.  
Table 6: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
household income subgroups; choice radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Household income: 
low 
income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
low 
income 
medium 
income 
high income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.197*** 0.127*** 0.102***    
 (0.0294) (0.0236) (0.0265)    
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.154*** 0.0553** 0.0568** 0.00480* 0.00539*** -0.00420* 
 (0.0297) (0.0245) (0.0266) (0.00275) (0.00206) (0.00249) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0765** 0.000588 -0.0205 0.00271 0.00419** -0.00544** 
 (0.0298) (0.0243) (0.0269) (0.00286) (0.00209) (0.00247) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.0908*** 0.0262 -0.0202 0.00484* 0.00172 -0.00708*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0248) (0.0288) (0.00294) (0.00218) (0.00261) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0115 0.00376 -0.0337 0.00636* 0.00100 0.000935 
 (0.0363) (0.0316) (0.0358) (0.00354) (0.00302) (0.00326) 
Untreated cohorts -0.106*** -0.0301 -0.00249 -0.00318 -0.00184 0.00537** 
(1972-1976) (0.0286) (0.0231) (0.0259) (0.00275) (0.00207) (0.00250) 
       
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass pass pass 
Observations 396,923 873,180 445,318 135,210 312,206 162,766 
R-squared 
‡
 0.138 0.131 0.182 0.113 0.113 0.154 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes.  
 
The effect of more school choice on cognitive skills (see Columns 4-6 in Table 6) is 
similar for the low and medium income households, but with an increase of around 
0.005 points for each additional school, and the cognitive score varying between 0 and 
9, it is very small. Children from high income households display an equally small, but 
                                                                                                                                               
43 We test statistical significance between point estimates from separate regressions by running a fully interacted 
estimation of the model; results are available from the others upon request. 
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negative effect. Looking at the distribution of 9
th
 grade math marks, we find no effect 
for any income group on the probability of receiving a passing grade
44
, and effects of an 
around 0.3 percentage points increase in the likelihood of achieving a high grade per 
additional school in the commuting distance for all three groups (see Table 7). 
However, the identification of the result is weak for the high income group as the 
placebo test fails. Concerning the probability of having committed a crime until age 22, 
we almost only find significant effects in the lowest income group, where an increase in 
choice leads to a small reduction of about 0.1 percentage points in the probability (see 
Table 8)
45
.  
Table 7: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different household income subgroups; choice radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
RECEIVING A HIGH GRADE IN MATH 
RECEIVING A PASSING GRADE IN 
MATH 
Household income: low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
low 
income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.0037*** 0.0031*** 0.0021*** 0.0007 0.0006* 0.0002 
 (0.00049) (0.00044) (0.00057) (0.00048) (0.00037) (0.00038) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0032*** 0.0024*** 0.0014** 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.00049) (0.00044) (0.00056) (0.00049) (0.00037) (0.00038) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0024*** 0.0016*** 0.0004 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.00050) (0.00045) (0.00057) (0.00049) (0.00037) (0.00039) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.0013** 0.0009* -0.0000 0.0007 0.0010** 0.0001 
 (0.00054) (0.00047) (0.00059) (0.00054) (0.00040) (0.00041) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0000 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.00064) (0.00058) (0.00073) (0.00066) (0.00052) (0.00049) 
Untreated cohorts -0.0021*** -0.0016*** -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 
(1972-1976) (0.00049) (0.00043) (0.00056) (0.00050) (0.00037) (0.00039) 
       
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass pass pass 
Observations 395,334 871,845 444,937 395,334 871,845 444,937 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0425 0.0411 0.0661 0.105 0.124 0.163 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
                                                 
44 There are a couple of very small but statistically significant effects for the medium income group, but qualitatively 
the result for this outcome suggests no effect. 
45Note that the average probability of ever having been committed for a crime at age 22, as reported in Table 1, was 
around 20 per cent for the low-income group. 
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Table 8: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 for different 
household income subgroups; choice radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE CRIME UNTIL AGE 22 
Household income: low income medium income high income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.00143*** -0.000447 -0.000331 
 (0.000381) (0.000284) (0.000287) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.00169*** -0.000606** -0.000283 
 (0.000390) (0.000288) (0.000291) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.00165*** -0.000364 -0.000211 
 (0.000422) (0.000303) (0.000310) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000609 0.000157 8.49e-05 
 (0.000545) (0.000379) (0.000387) 
Untreated cohorts 0.00156*** 0.000679** 0.000453 
(1972-1976) (0.000380) (0.000290) (0.000296) 
    
Placebo Test pass pass pass 
Observations 326,904 717,262 364,926 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0315 0.0304 0.0269 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
 
Overall, the effects are small as well as the differences between the subgroups. We 
thus find no evidence that would support the claim that disadvantaged children had been 
harmed by the reform. On the contrary, we find slightly higher point estimates for low-
income households, suggesting that low income households benefited more from the 
potential choice options, although this difference is very small.  
6.2.2 Heterogeneity with respect to educational background of parents 
Next, we explore whether children whose parents have a lower education were 
differently affected by the choice reform compared to children with higher educated 
parents. Table 9 and Table 10 show that there is no indication that children with low 
educated parents, defined as both parents having no more than compulsory education, 
have benefited less from school choice in terms of grades at the end of 9
th
 grade. On the 
contrary, most of the point estimates for children from households with a lower 
education are either similar, or even slightly larger, compared to those of higher 
education background. Concerning the cognitive score in the military draft, one school 
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more increases the score by 0.015 for the youngest cohorts of students with low 
educated parents (see Column 4 in Table 9). The corresponding coefficient for children 
from higher educated parents is statistically insignificant and significantly smaller. This 
result is robust to using the alternative radius of 2km, where the point estimates differ 
even more
46
. 
Table 9: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
parental education levels; choice radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Parental education is… 
more than 
compulsory 
compulsory 
more than 
compulsory 
compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.133*** 0.148***   
 (0.0191) (0.0436)   
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0806*** 0.0911** 0.00110 0.0144*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0430) (0.00159) (0.00448) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0118 0.0358 -0.000499 0.0141*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0429) (0.00159) (0.00438) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.0167 0.129*** -0.00157 0.0154*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0441) (0.00167) (0.00461) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0165 0.0382 0.00239 0.00557 
 (0.0236) (0.0559) (0.00218) (0.00594) 
Untreated cohorts -0.0351* -0.0686* 0.00130 -0.0131*** 
(1972-1976) (0.0181) (0.0406) (0.00160) (0.00431) 
     
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,550,081 165,340 544,573 65,609 
R-squared 
‡
 0.175 0.060 0.129 0.050 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
                                                 
46 See Table 38 and Table 39. 
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Table 10: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different parental education levels; choice radius “median commuting distance" 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE MATH 
Parental education is… 
more than 
compulsory 
compulsory 
more than 
compulsory 
compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00311*** 0.00242*** 0.000435 0.000221 
 (0.000365) (0.000706) (0.000284) (0.000771) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00244*** 0.00232*** 0.000260 -0.000871 
 (0.000361) (0.000670) (0.000286) (0.000747) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00155*** 0.00123* 0.000107 -0.00124 
 (0.000366) (0.000683) (0.000286) (0.000754) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000499 0.00138* 0.000448 0.00141* 
 (0.000379) (0.000749) (0.000306) (0.000832) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000319 0.000983 -0.000307 0.000361 
 (0.000458) (0.000934) (0.000390) (0.00110) 
Untreated cohorts -0.00132*** -0.00101 -0.000267 0.000439 
(1972-1976) (0.000351) (0.000657) (0.000289) (0.000759) 
     
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,547,652 164,464 1,547,652 164,464 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0575 0.0206 0.133 0.0609 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
6.2.3 Heterogeneity with respect to migrant background 
Now we turn to analysing whether children whose parents were both born outside of 
Sweden were differently affected by the choice reform. Again, we find that the point 
estimates for the effect of school choice on marks and the cognitive score are very 
similar in size for children with at least one Swedish parent and those whose parents 
were both born outside of Sweden (see Table 11). The same holds when we study the 
effect on the probability to receive a high or a pass final math grade (see Table 12). 
However, when we instead use the choice measure counting the number of schools 
within 2km around a student’s home, the results are more mixed47 and indicate larger 
effects for children of Swedish parents on 9
th
 grade marks but smaller effects on 
cognitive scores in the youngest cohort group. Most of these differences are however 
                                                 
47 See Table 41. 
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not, or only at the 90% confidence level, statistically significantly different. Moreover, 
we find that, for children whose parents were both born outside of Sweden in the 
youngest cohorts, having one more school within 2km increases the likelihood of 
having a university degree by 1.15 percentage points, while this number is smaller and 
only weakly identified, as indicated by significant Placebo tests, for children with 
Swedish parents
48
. Overall, the results for the subpopulations of children with or 
without at least one native Swedish parent are less robust than the results for the other 
subpopulations. One conclusion that can be drawn is, however, that there is no clear 
pattern indicating that children from immigrants have been harmed by more choice at 
the outset of the reform compared to children with at least one Swedish-born parent. 
Table 11: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
parental migration backgrounds; choice radius “median commuting distance" 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Parental migration background 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.142*** 0.161***   
 (0.0186) (0.0547)   
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0892*** 0.0810 0.00118 0.00972* 
 (0.0190) (0.0537) (0.00156) (0.00542) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0172 -0.00374 -0.000621 0.00739 
 (0.0186) (0.0542) (0.00157) (0.00539) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.0180 0.0767 -0.00212 0.00790 
 (0.0200) (0.0561) (0.00167) (0.00562) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0185 0.00110 0.00270 0.00242 
 (0.0237) (0.0664) (0.00216) (0.00712) 
Untreated cohorts -0.0361** -0.0871 0.00160 -0.00990* 
(1972-1976) (0.0177) (0.0534) (0.00158) (0.00545) 
     
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,599,471 115,950 575,487 34,695 
R-squared 
‡
 0.191 0.139 0.139 0.150 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
                                                 
48 See Table 43. 
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Table 12: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different parental migration backgrounds; choice radius “median commuting distance" 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE MATH 
Parental education is… 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00330*** 0.00282*** 0.000471* 0.000697 
 (0.000362) (0.000859) (0.000281) (0.000978) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00261*** 0.00249*** 0.000270 -1.15e-05 
 (0.000359) (0.000849) (0.000283) (0.000969) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00171*** 0.00161* 8.60e-05 -0.000396 
 (0.000363) (0.000868) (0.000283) (0.000977) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000554 0.000581 0.000347 0.00141 
 (0.000379) (0.000908) (0.000309) (0.00101) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000141 -0.00134 -0.000330 -0.000129 
 (0.000456) (0.00104) (0.000399) (0.00124) 
Untreated cohorts -0.00141*** -0.000966 -0.000230 -0.000292 
(1972-1976) (0.000348) (0.000846) (0.000287) (0.000988) 
     
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,596,671 115,445 1,596,671 115,414 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0606 0.0527 0.135 0.121 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
6.2.4 Heterogeneity with respect to high crime vs. low crime area 
Lastly, we investigate whether children living in high crime areas benefit more or 
less from school choice than children living in low or medium crime areas. In this 
section, we hence explore if the effects differ with respect to the area characteristics of 
the student instead of with respect to the parental background.  
When we stratify the sample according to living in a high or low crime area in 1991, 
we find that students in high crime areas have often benefitted more from school choice, 
in terms of short-run outcomes, than those in low or medium level crime areas (see 
Section 8.1.4 in the appendix). An important fact to point out, however, is that the high 
crime municipalities are mostly urban municipalities, and we found in our companion 
paper (see WEF13) that the effects on marks are mostly driven by individuals living in 
urban areas. In order to not confuse heterogeneous effects between areas with different 
crime rates with heterogeneity arising from living in an urban or rural municipality, we 
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run four separate regressions for all combinations of living in high crime vs. medium 
level crime and urban vs. non-urban municipalities. 
Table 13 shows the results for the percentile rank in 9
th
 grade marks and the 
cognitive score, and Table 14 shows results on the distribution of 9
th
 grade math marks.  
Table 13: Effect of choice on the percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for local areas with high or 
low/medium youth crime levels; choice radius “median commuting distance"  
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Local area 
characteristics 
1990–91 
low/medium crime high crime low/medium crime high crime 
non-urban urban 
non-
urban 
urban 
non-
urban 
urban 
non-
urban 
urban 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  -0.203** 0.0862*** -0.701 0.285*** 
    
 
(0.0926) (0.0278) (0.633) (0.0315) 
    
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.0361 0.0519* -1.314* 0.191*** 0.0192** -0.00268 0.0759 -0.000855 
 
(0.0949) (0.0282) (0.697) (0.0333) (0.00965) (0.00227) (0.0599) (0.00309) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.185* -0.00547 -0.402 0.121*** 0.0114 -0.00355 0.0795 -0.000365 
 
(0.0946) (0.0276) (0.722) (0.0340) (0.00893) (0.00226) (0.0699) (0.00317) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.0878 0.0133 -0.850 0.0830** 0.00764 -0.00610** 0.0479 0.00117 
 
(0.0942) (0.0283) (0.596) (0.0350) (0.00963) (0.00240) (0.0572) (0.00321) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0694 -0.0475 -0.0510 0.0403 0.00447 -0.000526 0.0388 -0.00375 
 
(0.117) (0.0374) (0.696) (0.0346) (0.0117) (0.00301) (0.0612) (0.00392) 
Untreated cohorts 0.233*** -0.00537 0.837* -0.150*** -0.0153** 0.00612*** 0.0151 0.00218 
(1972-1976) (0.0704) (0.0271) (0.438) (0.0284) (0.00686) (0.00229) (0.0395) (0.00293) 
         
Placebo Test fail pass pass pass pass pass fail pass 
Observations 741,774 658,873 42,72 232,42 266,858 236,075 14,876 77,508 
R-squared 
‡
 0.164 0.201 0.169 0.197 0.124 0.153 0.130 0.178 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete list of 
included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 14 : Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for local areas 
with high or low/medium youth crime levels; choice radius “median commuting distance" 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE 
Local area 
characteristics 1990–91 
low/medium crime high crime low/medium crime high crime 
non-
urban 
urban 
non-
urban 
urban non-urban urban non-urban Urban 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  -0.000358 0.00300*** 0.00925 0.00492*** -0.00300** 0.000631 0.00236 0.000716 
 
(0.00181) (0.000530) (0.0112) (0.000643) (0.00125) (0.000407) (0.00864) (0.000570) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00257 0.00266*** -0.00266 0.00359*** -0.00225* 0.000524 -0.0112 0.000449 
 
(0.00192) (0.000527) (0.0124) (0.000639) (0.00127) (0.000411) (0.00893) (0.000577) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00108 0.00188*** 0.00506 0.00290*** -0.00250** 0.000373 -0.00772 0.000231 
 
(0.00184) (0.000531) (0.0119) (0.000678) (0.00126) (0.000413) (0.00853) (0.000580) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.00102 0.00136** -0.00213 0.00165** -0.000800 0.000748* -0.0102 0.00104* 
 
(0.00195) (0.000542) (0.0116) (0.000662) (0.00160) (0.000421) (0.0113) (0.000629) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.00117 -0.000239 -0.0237 0.00153** -0.00252 -6.36e-05 0.00603 -5.58e-05 
 
(0.00230) (0.000742) (0.0149) (0.000753) (0.00191) (0.000651) (0.0113) (0.000715) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000518 -0.00184*** 0.000798 -0.00240*** 0.00202* -0.000585 0.0103 -4.68e-05 
(1972-1976) (0.00135) (0.000525) (0.00699) (0.000560) (0.00119) (0.000415) (0.00812) (0.000578) 
         
Placebo Test pass pass fail fail pass pass pass pass 
Observations 740,459 657,742 42,609 231,729 740,459 657,742 42,609 231,729 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0507 0.0658 0.0553 0.0735 0.127 0.140 0.126 0.145 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete 
list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
 
To begin with, it should be noted that most of the estimated effects are very small, 
and often not significantly different from zero. Table 13 shows that the small positive 
results on the average percentile rank in marks are mostly driven by individuals living 
in high crime urban areas, while results in other areas are even sometimes statistically 
significantly negative. However, the identification for the results for the non-urban low 
and medium level crime areas is rather weak, indicated by the failing placebo test. A 
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similar pattern arises also when using the 2km radius to construct the choice measure
49
. 
For the cognitive score at the age of around 18, we find almost no statistically 
significant effect (see Table 13). The probability of achieving a high grade in math is 
positively affected in high crime urban areas, while effects are mostly insignificant for 
the other subgroups (see Table 14). Correspondingly, the probability of receiving a 
passing grade is negatively affected by more choice for some cohorts in all but the high 
crime municipal regions, where the point estimates are positive and sometimes 
significant (see Table 14). Taken together, there is no indication that children living in 
high crime areas were harmed by the school choice as introduced by the reform. Though 
the evidence is sometimes weak, it rather seems to be the case that those living in urban 
high crime areas benefited relatively more than others from increased choice options. 
For all of the above subgroups, we also ran further estimations for the probability of 
committing a crime until age 22, receiving a university degree until age 25, and being 
employed at age 25
50
. Especially for the latter two, we often ran into identification 
problems in the sense that the placebo test failed. Estimated effects were small but the 
placebo estimates were often of the same size, which is why results on these later 
outcomes should not be overinterpreted. However, as for the above presented results, 
there was almost never an indication for students from more disadvantaged backgrounds 
benefiting less from having more schools nearby before the choice reform. 
Qualitatively, the same is true when estimating the effect of choice using the number of 
schools within a 2 km radius instead of the median commuting distance
51
. 
6.3 Robustness analysis 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we also estimated alternative regression 
specifications. Moreover, we present results using the pre-reform choice measures as 
instrumental variables for actual choice opportunities at the time of decision making. 
 
                                                 
49 See Table 46 and Table 47. 
50 See tables in Section 8.1.7.2. 
51 See tables in Section 8.1.7.2. 
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6.3.1 Alternative regression specifications 
First, as we study student outcomes over a long time period, it is possible that the 
influence of the included covariates has changed over time. To account for this, we 
allow the coefficients of the covariates to differ between treatment windows by adding 
the interaction of the individual, parish and municipality level covariates and the 
treatment windows to the regression specification. The results, which are available upon 
request from the authors, show that although the pattern of effects in general remains 
the same across treatment windows and groups of students, the sizes of the estimates are 
much smaller than the baseline, often about half the size. They are also often not 
significantly different from zero.   
Second, several other education-related reforms were implemented during the 
1990s
52. In particular, the 1991 decentralization reform increased the municipalities’ 
role in the provision of compulsory education, which means that municipality level 
factors might have had a changing role for the outcomes of students over time. Whereas 
our baseline specification controls for the influence of both a set of observed 
municipality level variables, and, through the inclusion of municipality fixed effects, for 
time constant unobserved municipality factors, it may thus be that the influence of such 
unobserved factors differs over time. We allow for this by adding interactions between 
the municipality fixed effects and the treatment window dummies to the regression (in 
addition to the interaction between covariates and treatment window dummies). As this 
specification exhibited convergence problems for the probit estimations, we only run 
regressions using OLS/LPM. The results for the binary outcomes should thus be 
interpreted with caution. The point estimates from this specification (available upon 
request from the authors) are further reduced and often not statistically different from 
zero. 
Third, even though the baseline specification includes a number of local area level 
covariates, it could still be that our school choice option index captures effects of other 
unobserved local factors. To the extent that such effects remain stable over time, we can 
control for this by including fixed effects at the same level as was used to construct the 
                                                 
52 See a discussion in the appendix of the companion paper, Wondratschek et al. (2013b). 
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choice-option index, that is, the 100*100m geographical coordinate boxes. We do this 
by adding fixed effects for the geographical coordinate boxes to the estimation. 
However, similarly to the regression including interactions between municipality and 
treatment window dummies, these specifications were estimated as linear functions for 
all outcomes, and the cautionary remark for the binary outcome variables thus also 
applies here. The results from this set of regressions follow a similar pattern as when the 
coordinate box fixed effects are excluded, although the coefficients are in general larger 
and more often statistically different from zero. To a large degree, this is explained by 
the fact that we lose observations in coordinate boxes without repeated observations, 
which is more often the case in non-urban than urban areas. As effects are larger in 
urban areas (see Wondratschek et al. 2013b), and those observations have an increased 
weight in the smaller sample, we observe larger point estimates for the average effect.
53
   
Taken together, we interpret the results from these additional analyses as supportive 
of our main conclusion, namely that we find no evidence that students – neither from a 
less nor from a more socio-economically advantaged background – were harmed by the 
introduction of the school choice reform in 1992. The baseline analysis furthermore 
suggests somewhat larger effects for some of the more disadvantaged groups of 
students. Although this pattern remains the same in the robustness analysis, the fact that 
the estimated effects are often smaller and often not statistically significantly different 
from zero suggests that this finding should be interpreted with caution. In particular, and 
this holds both for the baseline and the robustness analysis, the estimated effects are 
small for all groups of students and should qualitatively be viewed as very small or 
close to zero effects. 
6.3.2 Instrumental variable estimations 
Furthermore, as an alternative to our main estimations, we also estimated an IV-
regression, where we use the pre-reform choice measure as an instrument for the 
                                                 
53 We ran this specification for all the above specified regressions: that is, for the baseline specification as well as 
when we included covariates interacted with the treatment windows, and, additionally, municipality specific effects 
interacted with the treatment windows. The pattern of larger effects when the coordinate fixed effects are included 
holds for all these specifications. It shall be noted that, in contrast to the previous specifications were standard errors 
were clustered at the school by year level, we now estimated standard errors clustered at the level of the geographical 
coordinate boxes. 
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amount of choice available at the time when the student enters 7
th
 grade. This 
specification was estimated for the outcome percentile rank in 9
th
 grade marks, the 
result is given in Table 24 in the Appendix. Since the pre- and post-reform choice 
measures are closely related (as reported in Section 8.1.2 in the Appendix), these results 
are bound to be relatively similar. This is also what we find: For the younger birth 
cohorts, the effects of choice on the percentile rank in marks are positive across all 
groups of students, and (with a few exceptions) statistically significant, although the 
sizes of the effects are smaller than the estimates of the baseline specification. For the 
early cohorts, the estimates are often statistically insignificant, although in some cases 
statistically significant and negative. Overall, the differences between groups of students 
are small. The qualitative result of positive, but very small effects for all groups of 
younger cohorts, and of even smaller differences across groups, thus holds also in the 
IV-analysis. Note however that the IV- specification has a slightly different 
interpretation than the baseline regression: whereas the latter measures the reduced form 
effects of the reform, including the formation of schools after the reform, the IV-
estimates measure the effect of the actual choice options available when the decision for 
a school is made. 
Finally, we also ran the baseline specification using different measures for the 
number of schools near a student’s residence. That is, in addition to measuring school 
choice as the number of schools within a radius equalling the median commuting 
distance in the municipality, which was our baseline specification, or within 2km, which 
we also presented above, we also ran specifications where we counted the number of 
schools within a radius of 3, 4, 5, and 10 km, respectively. The results, which are 
available from the authors upon request, do not differ qualitatively from the overall 
results of the above presented analysis. 
7 Conclusion 
We can conclude that our analyses show no evidence indicating that children from a 
socio-economically disadvantaged or immigration background have been harmed by 
school choice as it evolved after the introduction of the 1992 reform. The effects are 
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small or zero and similar for different subgroups. If anything, they rather indicate 
slightly more positive effects on some outcomes for socio-economically disadvantaged 
children than for socio-economically more advantaged children, although the positive 
effects often disappear in alternative specifications. 
In order to avoid endogenous sorting of schools and parents into different areas after 
the reform, we measure school choice right before the introduction of the reform, which 
is, as we show, still closely related to the school choice at the time of decision making. 
Our estimates thus capture the effect of more school choice as is present right at the 
outset of the reform, including the dynamic processes that are a direct result of it, like 
the opening or closing of public and private schools and moves by parents in response 
to the changed system. Moreover, as we can test for, and sometimes find, placebo 
effects, especially concerning adult outcomes, we focus our interpretation on the most 
reliable results.  
Previous studies analysing the Swedish 1992 choice reforms find that children from a 
lower-educated or migrant background are not hurt by an increased private school share, 
but that they benefit relatively less (Sandström and Bergström (2005), Björklund et al. 
(2004), Ahlin (2003)). These results are, however, no contradiction to the ones found in 
this study, as they focus on a different phenomenon of the choice reform. While 
previous studies have focused on studying the effects of competition by private schools, 
this study evaluates the overall dynamic effects that work through having more choice 
at the outset of the reform, that is also among public schools.  
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Additional analysis 
This section presents additional analyses that are not included in the main body of 
the paper. 
8.1.1 Segregation between schools 
As the school choice reform has allowed all students to choose the school that they 
would like to attend, it may be that the composition of students at individual schools 
across Sweden has changed after as compared to before the reform. In particular, one 
argument against free school choice often mentioned in the political debate was the 
concern that segregation between schools along the socio-economic or migration 
background of the parents may increase with free school choice (see National Board of 
Education (2003), p.45). At the same time, one could argue that school choice mitigates 
existing residential segregation as the composition of schools is no longer necessarily 
identical to that of the residential area. Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007) have found that 
segregation between public and private schools along parental education and migration 
background increases with an increasing share of students attending private schools in a 
municipality. As this result focuses on the growth of private schools, it does not take 
into account the effects of choice among public schools, which is of high relevance for 
the present study.  
In order to explore whether segregation among students in grades 7-9 has changed 
after the reform, we compute the standard deviation in the share of students of a specific 
socio-economic background across schools in Sweden for each cohort of students born 
between 1972 and 1990. We then compare the average of this value for cohorts that 
were affected by the reform to the average for those that were not, that is we compare 
the standard deviation in student characteristics across schools between cohorts 1972-
1976 and 1977-1990. Note that this exercise does not show effects of school choice on 
student segregation in schools as residential segregation might have changed over time 
as well, impacting also the composition of students at different schools. It is merely a 
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way to describe whether Sweden has seen an increase in student segregation across 
schools after the 1992 school choice reform. 
Table 15 presents the results of this exercise for the socio-economic characteristics 
considered in this study, being parental education, income and immigration background. 
We can see from this table that there is no change in the degree of overall student 
segregation between Swedish schools offering grades 7-9 after the choice reform
54
. 
Table 15: Average between-school standard deviation of parental characteristics 
  
Mean value of the between school standard 
deviation 
Share in the school with: 
 
pre-reform 
 (cohorts 72-76)  
post-reform 
 (cohorts 77-90) 
Both parents non-Swedish   0.040 0.041 
Both parents only pre-secondary education   0.028 0.029 
Low household income  0.031 0.031 
Medium household income  0.037 0.037 
High household income  0.043 0.044 
Number of observations  5040 18851 
 
8.1.2 Relation between degree of choice measured before and after the reform 
In this section, we explore the relation between the degree of school choice as 
measured before the introduction of the reform, in 1991, and as measured at the actual 
time the child chooses a school for grades 7-9, at age 13. We conduct this analysis for 
cohorts that started grade 7 in or after 1992, i.e. for students born in or after 1979, as 
these are the cohorts for which we use the pre-reform measure instead of the actual 
measure of school choice in the main estimations that are presented in Section 6. In 
order for these main analyses to be meaningful, it is important that pre-reform and 
actual choice measures are related for all subgroups.  
Similar to the corresponding analysis in WEF13, we regress the actual choice 
measure, that is the number of schools within the median commuting distance of the 
municipality measured at age 13, on the number of schools within the child’s median 
 49 
 
commuting distance around her 1991 place of residence, i.e. the pre-reform choice 
measure that we use in the main analysis. In order to capture changes in the 
development of the number of schools over time, we interact the choice measure with a 
linear time trend. Since the variation that we use in the main estimations in Section 6 is 
conditional on covariates and cohort and municipality dummies, we include these 
covariates here as well and cluster on the municipality level
55
. 
Table 16 and Table 17 present the marginal effects of an additional school within the 
median commuting distance as measured before the reform on the number of schools 
nearby when the child is 13 years old for the different subgroups. The correlation 
between the pre-reform and the post-reform measure is increasing over time, suggesting 
an increase in the number of schools, and is mostly close to or larger than one. 
Moreover, the relation is similar for the different subgroups and only slightly smaller 
for children from a disadvantaged or migration background.  
The results thus suggest that the choice measures taken in 1991 are closely related to 
the post-reform measures taken at the time when children start grade 7 for all 
subgroups.  
                                                                                                                                               
54 This result also holds when distinguishing further between individual cohorts instead of just comparing pre- and 
post-reform cohorts. 
55 In accordance with main analyses, the covariates and municipality dummies are measured in 1991, that is at the 
pre-reform location of residence. 
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Table 16: Relation between pre-reform and post-reform choice measure, separately for 
subgroups according to household income and parental education 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE  ACTUAL NUMBER OF SCHOOLS WITHIN MEDIAN COMMUTING DISTANCE 
Household background 
low     
income 
medium 
income 
high   
income 
higher 
educated 
low 
educated 
Marginal effect of number of schools within median commuting distance in 1991 for: 
      
Cohorts 1988-1990  1.195*** 1.324*** 1.381*** 1.323*** 1.292*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0210) (0.0200) (0.0291) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 1.037*** 1.153*** 1.210*** 1.155*** 1.120*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0211) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.880*** 0.981*** 1.039*** 0.986*** 0.948*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0155) (0.0124) (0.0138) (0.0173) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.722*** 0.810*** 0.868*** 0.817*** 0.776*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0189) (0.0145) (0.0163) (0.0203) 
      
Observations 253,127 567,675 296,972 1,035,610 82,164 
R-squared 
‡
 0.731 0.784 0.805 0.782 0.784 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
 
Table 17: Relation between pre-reform and post-reform choice measure, separately for 
subgroups according to parental migration background and crime rate of local area 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE  ACTUAL NUMBER OF SCHOOLS WITHIN MEDIAN COMMUTING DISTANCE 
Migration background 
and area backgrounds 
at least one 
parent born in 
Sweden 
both parents 
born abroad 
low/medium 
crime local area 
high crime local 
area 
Marginal effect of number of schools within median commuting distance in 1991 for: 
     
Cohorts 1988-1990  1.328*** 1.221*** 1.358*** 1.211*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0278) (0.0165) (0.0517) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 1.162*** 1.060*** 1.188*** 1.053*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0222) (0.0129) (0.0335) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.996*** 0.899*** 1.017*** 0.894*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0208) (0.0111) (0.0186) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.830*** 0.738*** 0.847*** 0.736*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0242) (0.0117) (0.0185) 
     
Observations 1,035,577 82,197 842,062 187,315 
R-squared 
‡
 0.786 0.709 0.802 0.701 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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8.1.3 Linking the probability of attending a private school, and distance to 
school of attendance, to choice measures 
In this section, we study whether the degree of school choice as present at the outset 
of the reform is related to the probability of having made an active school choice. As we 
lack information on who has actually made an active choice, we use two indicators that 
we can construct from our data:   whether a student attended a private school and the 
distance to the school of attendance in 9
th
 grade. Attending a private school is clear 
evidence for an active school choice, as opting out of the public school system requires 
parents to act. The travel distance to school, however, can only be seen as an 
approximate indicator of school choice in general – to public as well as private schools - 
since students that opt out of the school of their catchment area are likely to increase 
their travel distance, as the catchment area school is in general the nearest one. 
However, with new schools opening up and old ones possibly closing down, an 
increased travel distance is not a perfect measure of choosing another than the default 
school. Moreover, any changes in travel distance over time may of course be related to 
other factors and general trends too, like for example a trend to move into less or more 
densely populated areas. In addition, the average size of a change in the travel distance 
may vary for different groups of the population without indicating a different propensity 
to make an active choice: if there are more schools close-by, making an active choice 
still does not imply a large increase in travel distance.  
Since attending a private school was extremely rare before the 1992 reform, when 
estimating the effect of having more schools to choose from, we cannot follow a before-
after comparison strategy as we did in Section 6. Nevertheless, since the private school 
share increased only gradually as it took some time for private schools to open up, it is 
also informative to analyse the development of the likelihood to attend a private school 
for the different subgroups over time.  
Regarding private school attendance, our results show that the effect of an additional 
school nearby on the probability of attending a private school is larger for the later 
cohorts, but is small and very similar across all groups (see Table 18 and Table 19).
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56 As could be seen in Table 3 the share of students attending a private school was, on average for the post-reform 
cohorts, between 2 and 6 percent depending on student subgroup. For the groups with the largest estimates in Table 
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The point estimates for children from migrants is slightly larger, but when using the 
choice measure counting the number of schools within a 2km radius instead of within 
the commuting distance, this result reverses. 
Over time, also the distance to the school of attendance is increasingly correlated 
with having more schools near the home (see Table 20 and Table 21). For students born 
in 1988–90, having one more school nearby is correlated with an increase in the travel 
distance to school of 0.07 km – 0.4 km compared to the pre-reform situation, depending 
on the student group studied. The increase, in absolute terms, is larger for students 
living in areas with low/medium youth crime rates and students with low-educated 
parents. The estimated increases in travel distance do not vary much depending on 
household income or whether the parents were born in Sweden or not. 
The overall pattern in these tables is compatible with the hypothesis that students in 
areas with more schools around have changed their school choice behaviour more than 
students in areas with fewer schools nearby after the introduction of the choice reform.  
Table 18: Effect of choice on probability of attending a private school, separately for 
subgroups according to household income and parental education 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
ATTENDING A PRIVATE SCHOOL 
Household 
background:  
low 
income✝ 
medium 
income✝ 
high 
income✝ 
parental 
education 
high✝ 
parental 
education 
low✝ 
Marginal effect of choice for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.000493** 0.000363** 0.000502 0.000425** 0.000633*** 
 (0.000219) (0.000179) (0.000316) (0.000216) (0.000182) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.000417*** 0.000326*** 0.000331 0.000324** 0.000516*** 
 (0.000135) (0.000111) (0.000226) (0.000139) (0.000135) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.000170* 0.0001 (0.0000) (0.0001) 0.000142** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000171) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000146* 0.000111* 0.000271 0.000172* 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000180) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
      
Observations 253,076 545,596 280,816 1,003,352 76,136 
R-squared 
‡
 0.122 0.137 0.116 0.128 0.140 
                                                                                                                                               
18 and Table 19, students with both parents born abroad and students in high crime areas, the average private school 
attendance, post-reform, was close to 6 percent. The results in Table 18 and Table 19 are thus small in relation to 
these average attendance rates. 
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Table 19: Effect of choice on probability of attending a private school, separately for 
subgroups according to parental migration background and crime level in local area 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ATTENDING A PRIVATE SCHOOL 
migration background and local 
area background 
at least 
one parent 
born in 
Sweden✝ 
both parents 
born 
abroad✝ 
low/medium 
crime local 
area✝ 
high crime 
local area✝ 
Marginal effect of choice for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.000325 0.00187*** 0.000223 0.00205*** 
 (0.000207) (0.000421) (0.000206) (0.000556) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.000238* 0.00154*** 0.000179 0.00165*** 
 (0.000131) (0.000318) (0.000129) (0.000395) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0001 0.000533** -2.36e-05 0.00108*** 
 (0.0001) (0.000215) (9.02e-05) (0.000234) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000122 0.000724*** 4.35e-05 0.000949*** 
 (0.0001) (0.000185) (9.09e-05) (0.000175) 
     
Observations 1,000,823 78,665 876,775 180,901 
R-squared 
‡
 0.133 0.123 0.135 0.106 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, 
*. For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. ‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes.✝= left out 
municipality dummies to achieve convergence 
 
Table 20: Effect of choice on distance to school, separately for subgroups according to 
household income and parental education 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
DISTANCE TO SCHOOL 
Household 
background:  
low income 
medium 
income 
high income 
parental 
education 
high 
parental 
education 
low 
Marginal effect of choice for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.174*** 0.240*** 0.170*** 0.193*** 0.403*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0208) (0.0236) (0.0172) (0.0467) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.168*** 0.245*** 0.151*** 0.188*** 0.367*** 
 (0.0384) (0.0215) (0.0239) (0.0175) (0.0419) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.106*** 0.227*** 0.119*** 0.158*** 0.334*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0215) (0.0244) (0.0175) (0.0452) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.0647 0.185*** 0.129*** 0.136*** 0.221*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0243) (0.0254) (0.0188) (0.0457) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.00428 0.0621** 0.0284 0.0223 0.162*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0278) (0.0299) (0.0207) (0.0503) 
      
Observations 383,753 835,536 429,053 1,491,491 156,851 
R-squared 0.015 0.019 0.013 0.014 0.024 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, 
**, *. For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. 
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Table 21: Effect of choice on distance to school, separately for subgroups according to 
parental migration background and crime level in local area 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE DISTANCE TO SCHOOL 
migration background and local 
area background 
at least 
one parent 
born in 
Sweden 
both parents 
born abroad 
low/medium 
crime local 
area 
high crime 
local area 
Marginal effect of choice for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.216*** 0.219*** 0.308*** 0.0679** 
 (0.0172) (0.0578) (0.0227) (0.0297) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.212*** 0.214*** 0.302*** 0.0483 
 (0.0176) (0.0578) (0.0230) (0.0320) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.182*** 0.157*** 0.279*** -0.000377 
 (0.0175) (0.0586) (0.0230) (0.0318) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.152*** 0.118* 0.238*** 0.0386 
 (0.0189) (0.0639) (0.0247) (0.0328) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.0419** 0.0226 0.00658 0.0467 
 (0.0211) (0.0743) (0.0297) (0.0350) 
     
Observations 1,535,782 112,560 1,345,010 267,259 
R-squared 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.011 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, 
*. For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. 
 
8.1.4 Exploring heterogeneity with respect to whether individuals live in a high 
versus low or medium crime municipality, not splitting the sample into 
urban and non-urban areas 
As we present the results for different subgroups of students living in high versus 
low or medium crime areas in Section 6.2 separately for urban and non-urban 
municipalities, this section shows the results when not making the latter distinction. 
Looking first at the outcome percentile rank in 9
th
 grade marks in Table 22, we find that 
the point estimates are always positive and mostly significant in the high crime areas, 
and always negative and mostly significant in the low and medium crime areas
57
. 
Though the magnitude of the estimates is still very small, it thus seems that effects in 
the higher crime areas drive the positive pooled results. As outlined in Section 6.2, this 
                                                 
57 One interesting pattern to note is that these differential results between the high- and low/medium crime 
municipalities are due to differences in the estimates for the pre-reform (control group) cohorts, rather than 
differences in the post-reform choice estimates. That is, the estimates for the untreated cohorts 1972-76 suggest that 
having more schools nearby is negatively correlated with students’ outcomes in the high-crime areas, but 
significantly positively correlated with students’ outcomes in the low crime areas. For the post-reform cohorts, effects 
for both subgroups are almost always positive, but since we estimate the differential impact of choice over time, 
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is also related to the fact that municipalities with a higher crime rate are more often 
urban areas.  
With respect to the cognitive score (see columns 3 and 4 in Table 22) and the 
probability of receiving a high grade in math (see Table 23), we find no sizable 
differences in the size of the effects. Even though we find very small negative effects on 
the probability of receiving a passing grade (of around 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points) for 
those living in low crime areas, there is also a negative Placebo-effect, which makes the 
identification for this outcome difficult. Qualitatively, the results are similar when using 
the 2km radius (see Table 44 and Table 45). We can thus conclude again that we do not 
find any evidence for children in high crime areas having benefited less or having been 
harmed by the reform; if anything, they seem to have benefited a bit more. 
Table 22: Effect of choice on the percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for local 
areas with high or low/medium youth crime levels; choice radius “median commuting 
distance" 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Local area 
characteristics 1990–91 
low/medium 
crime 
high crime 
low/medium 
crime 
high crime 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.0742*** 0.221***   
 (0.0251) (0.0297)   
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0328 0.136*** -0.00212 0.000694 
 (0.0253) (0.0313) (0.00198) (0.00286) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.0358 0.0734** -0.00387** 0.000675 
 (0.0249) (0.0312) (0.00196) (0.00299) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.0129 0.0547* -0.00519** 0.000626 
 (0.0255) (0.0325) (0.00206) (0.00299) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0793** 0.0546* 0.000681 0.000944 
 (0.0334) (0.0326) (0.00262) (0.00361) 
Untreated cohorts 0.0240 -0.119*** 0.00512** 0.000716 
(1972-1976) (0.0244) (0.0272) (0.00203) (0.00276) 
     
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 
1,400,647 
 
275,140 
 
502,933 
 
92,384 
 
R-squared 
‡
 
 
0.185 
 
0.194 0.142 0.170 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                               
taking the pre-reform cohorts 1972-76 as the baseline, we find negative coefficients for the low/medium crime areas, 
and positive coefficients for the high-crime areas. 
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Table 23: Effect of choice on the probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math 
for local areas with high or low/medium youth crime levels; choice radius “median 
commuting distance" 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE 
Local area 
characteristics 1990–91 
low/medium crime high crime 
low/medium 
crime 
high crime 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00341*** 0.00466*** 0.000114 0.00180*** 
 
(0.000464) (0.000558) (0.000376) (0.000449) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00289*** 0.00339*** -4.84e-05 0.00139*** 
 
(0.000459) (0.000555) (0.000380) (0.000451) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00205*** 0.00254*** -0.000223 0.00112** 
 
(0.000464) (0.000592) (0.000380) (0.000451) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.00118** 0.00130** 0.000208 0.00146*** 
 
(0.000475) (0.000584) (0.000385) (0.000521) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000773 0.00153** -0.000903 0.000781 
 
(0.000634) (0.000668) (0.000573) (0.000636) 
Untreated cohorts -0.00183*** -0.00239*** 3.75e-05 -0.00129*** 
(1972-1976) (0.000460) (0.000491) (0.000385) (0.000444) 
     
Placebo Test pass fail fail pass 
Observations 1,398,201 274,338 1,398,201 274,338 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0589 0.0697 0.133 0.141 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
8.1.5 Further robustness analysis 
In cases where the placebo test fails, that is where we find that the effect of the 
number of schools nearby has changed already for unaffected cohorts born in 1975 and 
1976 compared to cohorts born in 1972 to 1974, we modelled and estimated a pre-
reform trend to control for these changes. To this end, we included both linear and 
quadratic time trends in the effect of the number of schools in the estimation and 
allowed the corresponding coefficients to differ between treatment windows. Then, we 
repeated the placebo test, that is we tested whether this trend captured all time-variation 
in the effect among cohorts before the reform. However, as this was mostly not the case, 
meaning that the identification problem could almost never be mitigated by controlling 
for a pre-reform trend, we do not show corresponding estimates. 
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8.1.6 Instrumental variable estimation of effects of actual school choice 
In this section, we conduct instrumental variable (IV) regressions to estimate the 
effect of actual choice options on student outcomes. Basically, the results of Section 
8.1.2 represent the first-stage component, where the pre-reform measures (which are 
exogenous with respect to the reform) are used to predict later choice options. The 
following table now provides the "second-stage", i.e. the effect of actual choice on 
student outcomes (using the pre-reform measure as the excluded instrumental variable). 
In Table 24 we show the instrumental variable regression of actual school choice 
options, using the pre-reform choice measure as instrument. We note that the overall 
pattern of results from the IV analysis resembles the results of the baseline analysis: For 
the younger birth cohorts, the effects of choice on the percentile rank marks are positive 
across all groups of students. The sizes of the effects are however smaller. This is 
roughly in line with the results of Section 8.1.2, where we found for the younger cohorts 
that the actual number of schools increases with the pre-reform measure by a factor of 
about 1.2. Thus the effects of actual choice must be smaller in magnitude than those of 
the baseline regression. For cohorts who were already attending compulsory school 
when the reform was introduced, i.e. those born in 1984 or earlier, the coefficients in 
Table 24 are often negative, and sometimes statistically significant. 
In any case, the differences between groups of students are small, although the point 
estimates tend to be somewhat larger among students with at least one Swedish-born 
parent, compared to students with two foreign-born students, and among students in 
high-crime, compared to low-crime, areas. This pattern somewhat contrasts to the 
results from the baseline estimation, where the larger coefficients were found for the 
students with two foreign-born students. However, we would like to emphasize that the 
qualitative result, of positive, but very small, effects for all groups of younger cohorts, 
and of even smaller differences across groups, holds also in the IV-analysis. 
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Table 24: Instrumental variable regression: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks 
for different parental or local area backgrounds; choice radius “median commuting 
distance" 
OUTCOME VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS 
Household background 
high 
income 
medium 
income 
low 
income 
more than 
compulsory 
education 
only 
compulsory 
education 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts, for: 
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.0666*** 0.0684*** 0.0696*** 0.0670*** 0.0663*** 
 (0.00888) (0.00870) (0.0118) (0.00699) (0.0207) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0377*** 0.0203** 0.0402*** 0.0326*** 0.0260 
 (0.00902) (0.00961) (0.0128) (0.00732) (0.0213) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.0209* -0.0249** -0.0238 -0.0213** -0.0201 
 (0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0158) (0.00902) (0.0239) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.0247 -0.00435 -0.0115 -0.0200 0.0671** 
 (0.0193) (0.0158) (0.0233) (0.0139) (0.0321) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0485 -0.0117 -0.121*** -0.0505** -0.0252 
 (0.0331) (0.0295) (0.0333) (0.0207) (0.0542) 
      
First stage F-statistic ≥3470 ≥3641 ≥2555 ≥4004 ≥1593 
Observations 331,311 648,312 296,586 1,177,647 98,562 
R-squared 0.858 0.783 0.722 0.804 0.658 
      
Migration background 
and local area 
background 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
low/medium 
crime area 
high crime 
area 
 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts, for: 
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.0723*** 0.0625*** 0.0648*** 0.0804***  
 (0.00698) (0.0218) (0.00489) (0.0131)  
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0375*** 0.00675 0.0384*** 0.0220  
 (0.00736) (0.0224) (0.00539) (0.0134)  
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.0181** -0.0747*** -0.0149** -0.0288  
 (0.00919) (0.0264) (0.00681) (0.0177)  
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.0207 -0.00291 0.00314 -0.0527**  
 (0.0139) (0.0340) (0.0105) (0.0215)  
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0597*** -0.0621 -0.0623*** -0.0539*  
 (0.0212) (0.0589) (0.0225) (0.0291)  
      
First stage F-statistic ≥3686 ≥1859 ≥3532 ≥1767  
Observations 1,184,916 91,293 1,040,647 209,129  
R-squared 0.802 0.746 0.799 0.792  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. 
The First stage F-statistic gives the value of the smallest of the F-statistics from the four first stage regressions. 
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8.1.7 Tables reporting additional descriptive statistics and analyses 
This subsection presents, for reporting purposes, tables including more detailed 
descriptive statistics (in Section 8.1.7.1) and additional estimation results relating to the 
analyses in the main body of the text (in Section 8.1.7.2). 
 60 
 
8.1.7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics on covariates included in the estimation 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Municipality level variables       
Population density 392.35 876.36 64.00 
Average taxable income in year t-2 in 100 SEK, deflated 
to 2006 
1 079.05 153.39 1 067.89 
Urban municipality 0.54 0.50  
Parish level variables    
Share of 16--64 year olds born in Sweden 0.89 0.08 0.92 
Average yearly earnings of 20--64 year olds in 100 SEK 1 140.46 224.25 1 150.94 
Share of 20-64 year olds with university degree 0.20 0.09 0.18 
Share of 20-64 year olds that are employed 0.83 0.04 0.84 
Population density of 7--15 year olds in lower quartile of 
distribution 
0.09 0.28  
Population density of 7--15 year olds in highest quartile of 
distribution 
0.64 0.48  
Individual level variables    
Household income in 1000 SEK, deflated to 2006 373.77 382.38 350.00 
Household received welfare 0.06 0.24  
Age of mother at birth 27.78 5.05 27.00 
Single parent household 0.22 0.42  
Number of children 2.23 1.01 2.00 
Only child 0.23 0.42  
Child born in Sweden 0.96 0.19  
Mother born in Sweden 0.89 0.32  
Mother born in Scandinavia, outside of Sweden 0.05 0.21  
Mother born in western Europe, North America or 
Australia 
0.01 0.10  
Father born in Sweden 0.88 0.32  
Father born in Scandinavia, outside of Sweden 0.04 0.19  
Father born in western Europe, North America or 
Australia 
0.02 0.13  
Mother has university degree 0.31 0.46  
Mother's highest degree is from secondary education 0.49 0.50  
Father has university degree 0.27 0.44  
Father's highest degree is from secondary education 0.46 0.50  
     
Number of observations: 1 756 681       
Notes: summary statistics are on individual level, thus, statistics on municipal and parish level variables are weighted 
with the share of inhabitants. E.g.: this says that 55 per cent of the sample live in an urban municipality, it does not 
mean that 55per cent of municipalities are urban. 
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The following tables repeat the information discussed in Section 4.2, but additionally 
contain the standard deviation and number of observations in the different subgroups. 
Table 26: Descriptive statistics on outcome variables, separately for different household 
income groups 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
 
 
low income medium income high income 
  
pre-
reform 
cohorts 
post-
reform 
cohorts 
pre-
reform 
cohorts 
post-
reform 
cohorts 
pre-
reform 
cohorts 
post-
reform 
cohorts 
percentile rank    
marks 9 
mean 40.87 40.55 47.59 48.11 55.92 59.82 
sd 28.19 28.12 27.93 27.83 28.28 27.28 
N 100004 296919 224485 648695 113464 331854 
receive passing   
grade in math 
mean 0.713 0.835 0.773 0.885 0.821 0.929 
sd 0.452 0.371 0.419 0.319 0.384 0.258 
N 99240 296094 223856 647989 113259 331678 
receive high        
grade in math 
mean 0.308 0.294 0.356 0.370 0.429 0.511 
sd 0.462 0.455 0.479 0.483 0.495 0.500 
N 99240 296094 223856 647989 113259 331678 
cognitive score 
mean 4.718 4.639 4.978 4.919 5.497 5.600 
sd 1.926 1.928 1.896 1.905 1.914 1.889 
N 47467 90093 109378 205247 56300 107821 
crime until age 22 
mean 0.204 0.203 0.147 0.134 0.129 0.104 
sd 0.403 0.402 0.354 0.341 0.335 0.305 
N 103987 233623 229206 501059 116609 255475 
university degree    
age 25 
mean 0.244 0.292 0.331 0.389 0.472 0.576 
sd 0.429 0.455 0.470 0.487 0.499 0.494 
N 102877 162698 227150 351499 115268 178532 
employed age 25 
mean 0.678 0.671 0.729 0.714 0.695 0.654 
sd 0.467 0.470 0.445 0.452 0.460 0.476 
N 103206 164076 227692 353907 115611 180085 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 5. 
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Table 27: Descriptive statistics on outcome variables, separately for different levels of 
parental education 
  
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF PARENTS 
  
compulsory schooling 
more than compulsory 
schooling 
  
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
percentile rank marks 
9 
mean 36.37 34.01 50.34 50.68 
sd 26.55 25.80 28.41 28.44 
N 66721 98619 371232 1.179e+06 
receive passing grade 
in math 
mean 0.684 0.763 0.788 0.895 
sd 0.465 0.426 0.409 0.307 
N 66284 98180 370071 1.178e+06 
receive high grade in 
math 
mean 0.275 0.220 0.380 0.403 
sd 0.447 0.414 0.485 0.491 
N 66284 98180 370071 1.178e+06 
cognitive score 
mean 4.142 3.997 5.218 5.137 
sd 1.818 1.801 1.902 1.922 
N 31801 34827 181344 368334 
crime until age 22 
mean 0.186 0.201 0.150 0.137 
sd 0.389 0.401 0.357 0.344 
N 69070 89864 380732 900293 
university degree age 
25 
mean 0.159 0.191 0.381 0.440 
sd 0.366 0.393 0.486 0.496 
N 68456 71130 376839 621599 
employed age 25 
mean 0.740 0.728 0.702 0.684 
sd 0.439 0.445 0.457 0.465 
N 68738 72153 377771 625915 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 5. 
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Table 28: Descriptive statistics on outcome variables, separately for different parental 
migration backgrounds 
  PARENTAL MIGRATION BACKGROUND 
  both immigrants at least one is Swedish 
    
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
percentile rank        
marks 9 
mean 43.00 44.42 48.52 49.78 
sd 28.63 28.94 28.54 28.53 
N 24390 91560 413563 1.186e+06 
receive passing grade 
in math 
mean 0.686 0.824 0.777 0.889 
sd 0.464 0.381 0.416 0.314 
N 24152 91293 412203 1.184e+06 
receive high grade in 
math 
mean 0.276 0.304 0.369 0.396 
sd 0.447 0.460 0.483 0.489 
N 24152 91293 412203 1.184e+06 
cognitive score 
mean 4.197 4.201 5.100 5.095 
sd 1.966 1.924 1.917 1.927 
N 10017 25427 203128 377734 
crime until age 22 
mean 0.242 0.226 0.150 0.136 
sd 0.428 0.418 0.357 0.343 
N 25883 74372 423919 915785 
university degree age 
25 
mean 0.249 0.346 0.353 0.420 
sd 0.432 0.476 0.478 0.494 
N 25444 51737 419851 640992 
employed age 25 
mean 0.631 0.607 0.713 0.695 
sd 0.482 0.488 0.452 0.460 
N 25577 52375 420932 645693 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 5. 
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Table 29: Descriptive statistics on outcome variables, separately for different levels of 
youth crime in the local area in 1990–91 
  LOCAL AREA CHARACTERISTICS IN 1990–91 
  high crime low crime 
  
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
pre-reform 
cohort 
post-reform 
cohorts 
percentile rank marks 9 
mean 46.99 49.46 48.41 49.41 
sd 29.23 29.38 28.45 28.44 
N 65,699 209,441 359,066 1.042e+06 
receive passing grade in 
math 
mean 0.741 0.871 0.777 0.887 
sd 0.438 0.335 0.416 0.316 
N 65,260 209,078 357,934 1.040e+06 
receive high grade in 
math 
mean 0.338 0.382 0.369 0.391 
sd 0.473 0.486 0.482 0.488 
N 65,260 209,078 357,934 1.040e+06 
cognitive score 
mean 4.887 4.925 5.085 5.060 
sd 1.971 1.968 1.920 1.934 
N 31,600 62,204 175,126 332,403 
crime until age 22 
mean 0.197 0.170 0.148 0.138 
sd 0.398 0.376 0.355 0.344 
N 68,387 159,455 367,923 810,234 
university degree age 25 
mean 0.306 0.387 0.354 0.419 
sd 0.461 0.487 0.478 0.493 
N 67,683 109,439 364,269 568,839 
employed age 25 
mean 0.684 0.666 0.712 0.693 
sd 0.465 0.472 0.453 0.461 
N 67,902 110,437 365,238 573,077 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 5
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Table 5. 
 
8.1.7.2 Tables on subgroup analyses for later outcomes 
The following section presents additional tables on the results of the effects of more 
school choice through having many schools nearby just before the reform. Thus, as 
regards the structure, the tables are similar to those discussed in Section 6.2. The next 
subsection includes results from using the choice measure that counts the number of 
schools within the median commuting distance of the home municipality around a 
student’s home in 1991, the subsequent one presents those using a radius of 2km 
instead.  
 
 
Using the choice measure “number of schools within median commuting distance” 
 
Table 30: Effect of choice on education and employment at age 25 for different household 
income subgroups; choice radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE AT AGE 25 EMPLOYED AT AGE 25 
Household income: low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00174*** 0.00186*** 0.000604 0.00149*** 0.000671* 0.000237 
 (0.000454) (0.000404) (0.000507) (0.000476) (0.000375) (0.000465) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000840* 0.000531 -0.000740 0.00114** 0.000716* 0.000138 
 (0.000497) (0.000425) (0.000528) (0.000490) (0.000398) (0.000485) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000917 0.000145 -0.00119* 0.000922 -0.000128 -0.000569 
 (0.000607) (0.000545) (0.000658) (0.000598) (0.000483) (0.000605) 
Untreated cohorts -0.000758* -0.000301 0.000219 -0.0024*** -0.0012*** -0.000467 
(1972-1976) (0.000451) (0.000405) (0.000517) (0.000487) (0.000387) (0.000473) 
       
Placebo Test pass fail fail fail fail pass 
Observations 259,062 571,525 289,872 259,226 571,687 289,932 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0936 0.0917 0.134 0.0254 0.0271 0.0405 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 31: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 and education 
and employment at age 25 for different parental education levels; choice radius “median 
commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CRIME AGE 22 UNIVERSITY DEGREE AGE 25 EMPLOYED AGE 25 
Parental education 
is… 
more than 
compulsory 
compulsory 
more than 
compulsory✝ 
compulsory 
more than 
compulsory 
compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.00054*** -0.000811     
 (0.000197) (0.000600)     
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.00063*** -0.00122** 0.00134*** 0.00229*** 0.000416 0.00295*** 
 (0.000201) (0.000581) (0.000313) (0.000612) (0.000273) (0.000698) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.000431** -0.0022*** 0.0001 0.00171*** 0.000348 0.00251*** 
 (0.000216) (0.000623) (0.000329) (0.000656) (0.000296) (0.000731) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.000129 -0.00159** -0.000708* 0.000949 -0.000179 0.00136 
 (0.000287) (0.000745) (0.000414) (0.000848) (0.000343) (0.000909) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000728*** 0.000879 -0.000153 -0.000841 -0.0009*** -0.0033*** 
(1972-1976) (0.000201) (0.000585) (0.000312) (0.000603) (0.000279) (0.000712) 
       
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass fail pass 
Observations 1,255,800 153,292 984,366 136,093 984,638 136,207 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0364 0.0366 0.114 0.0374 0.0293 0.0339 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a 
complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. ✝For the outcome “receiving a high grade”, we left out household income and its 
squared term to achieve convergence.  
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Table 32: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 and education 
and employment at age 25 for different parental migration backgrounds; choice radius 
“median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CRIME AGE 22 UNIVERSITY DEGREE AGE 25 EMPLOYED AGE 25 
Parental migration 
background 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish✝ 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.000475** -0.00106     
 (0.000194) (0.000784)     
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.000508** -0.00181** 0.000852*** 0.00215*** 0.000520* 0.00124 
 (0.000197) (0.000790) (0.000308) (0.000804) (0.000270) (0.000887) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.000372* -0.00208** -0.000251 0.00128 0.000496* 0.000833 
 (0.000215) (0.000835) (0.000327) (0.000836) (0.000292) (0.000930) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.000189 -0.00156 -0.000747* 0.000721 -0.000182 0.000888 
 (0.000280) (0.00100) (0.000419) (0.00105) (0.000345) (0.00117) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000607*** 0.00142* 0.000252 -0.000779 -0.0011*** -0.00120 
(1972-1976) (0.000199) (0.000787) (0.000309) (0.000812) (0.000276) (0.000899) 
       
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass fail pass 
Observations 1,313,155 95,925 1,045,998 74,437 1,046,309 74,523 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0355 0.0319 0.128 0.103 0.0291 0.0300 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a 
complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1. ‡Pseudo R-
squared for binary outcomes.✝For the outcome “receiving a high grade”, we left out household income and its squared term 
to achieve convergence.  
 
 68 
 
 
Table 33: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 and education 
and employment at age 25 for local areas with high or low/medium youth crime levels; 
choice radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CRIME AGE 22 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE AGE 
25 
EMPLOYED AGE 25 
Local area 
characteristics 
1990–91 
low/medium 
crime 
high crime 
low/medium 
crime 
high crime 
low/medium 
crime 
high crime 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.00049** 0.000283     
 (0.000245) (0.000401)     
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.00055** 0.000031 0.000073 0.00209*** 0.000653* 0.000275 
 (0.000250) (0.000392) (0.000391) (0.000471) (0.000352) (0.000466) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.000425 -0.000092 -0.00086** 0.000971* 0.000687* -0.000063 
 (0.000268) (0.000420) (0.000395) (0.000509) (0.000369) (0.000503) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.000504 0.000264 -0.00139** 0.000412 -0.000666 -0.000201 
 (0.000367) (0.000492) (0.000595) (0.000585) (0.000486) (0.000518) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000554** -0.000121 0.00115*** -0.0026*** -0.0011*** -0.000582 
(1972-1976) (0.000254) (0.000385) (0.000404) (0.000414) (0.000368) (0.000465) 
       
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass pass pass 
Observations 1,154,475 221,285 919,955 173,060 920,240 173,157 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0359 0.0407 0.125 0.132 0.0302 0.0278 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For 
a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Using the choice measure “number of schools within 2km 
 
Table 34: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
household income subgroups; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Household income: low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.536*** 0.294*** 0.199**    
 (0.0924) (0.0740) (0.0822)    
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.403*** -0.0536 0.0289 0.0397*** 0.0216*** -0.00189 
 (0.0949) (0.0796) (0.0895) (0.00945) (0.00718) (0.00871) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0995 -0.157* -0.201** 0.0210** 0.0208*** -0.0144 
 (0.0989) (0.0803) (0.0937) (0.00973) (0.00719) (0.00895) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.158 -0.0316 -0.336*** 0.0370*** 0.0132* -0.0195** 
 (0.0989) (0.0802) (0.0998) (0.00942) (0.00723) (0.00894) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0974 -0.0213 -0.243** 0.0338*** 0.00823 0.000851 
 (0.105) (0.0891) (0.109) (0.0108) (0.00839) (0.00983) 
Untreated cohorts -0.0654 0.104* 0.320*** -0.0259*** -0.0145*** 0.00520 
(1972-1976) (0.0685) (0.0547) (0.0648) (0.00670) (0.00514) (0.00639) 
       
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass pass pass 
Observations 396,923 873,180 445,318 135,210 312,206 162,766 
R-squared 
‡
 0.138 0.131 0.182 0.113 0.113 0.154 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 35: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different household income subgroups; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
RECEIVING A HIGH GRADE IN MATH RECEIVING A PASSING GRADE IN MATH 
Household income: low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.0105*** 0.00715*** 0.00693*** 0.000156 -0.000122 -0.00148 
 (0.00153) (0.00134) (0.00167) (0.00131) (0.000940) (0.000951) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00784*** 0.00370*** 0.00390** -0.000992 -0.00174* -0.00210** 
 (0.00162) (0.00136) (0.00179) (0.00133) (0.000929) (0.000946) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00461*** 0.000515 -0.000916 -0.00108 -0.00141 -0.00114 
 (0.00169) (0.00149) (0.00180) (0.00133) (0.000911) (0.000956) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.00159 -0.00223 -0.0056*** 0.00190 0.00340*** 0.000278 
 (0.00169) (0.00143) (0.00191) (0.00170) (0.00125) (0.00132) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0000 -0.00137 -0.00377* -0.00122 -0.0001 -0.000703 
 (0.00194) (0.00176) (0.00210) (0.00196) (0.00147) (0.00152) 
Untreated cohorts -0.00250** -0.000675 0.00328** 0.000454 0.000565 0.00166* 
(1972-1976) (0.00122) (0.00101) (0.00134) (0.00119) (0.000872) (0.000931) 
       
Placebo Test fail fail pass pass pass pass 
Observations 395,334 871,845 444,937 395,334 871,845 444,937 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0423 0.0410 0.0661 0.105 0.124 0.163 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For 
a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 36: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 for different 
household income subgroups; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE CRIME UNTIL AGE 22 
Household income: low income medium income high income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.00275** 0.000760 0.00126 
 (0.00123) (0.000860) (0.000950) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.00253* 0.000462 0.000729 
 (0.00134) (0.000899) (0.000998) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.00287** -0.000281 0.00178* 
 (0.00135) (0.000920) (0.00107) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 4.03e-05 0.00129 0.00159 
 (0.00161) (0.00105) (0.00119) 
Untreated cohorts 0.00311*** 0.000507 -0.000851 
(1972-1976) (0.000958) (0.000690) (0.000758) 
    
Placebo Test pass pass pass 
Observations 326,904 717,262 364,926 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0315 0.0304 0.0269 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 37: Effect of choice on education and employment at age 25 for different household 
income subgroups; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE AT AGE 25 EMPLOYED AT AGE 25 
Household income: low income 
medium 
income 
high income low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00868*** 0.00728*** 0.0001 0.00420*** 0.00151 0.00132 
 (0.00153) (0.00134) (0.00189) (0.00155) (0.00116) (0.00152) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.00517*** 0.00444*** -0.00376** 0.00144 0.00161 -0.0000 
 (0.00160) (0.00137) (0.00188) (0.00153) (0.00121) (0.00165) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000698 0.00265* -0.00287 0.00299 0.00182 -0.00224 
 (0.00178) (0.00156) (0.00212) (0.00183) (0.00139) (0.00192) 
Untreated cohorts -0.00251** -0.000501 0.00392*** -0.006*** -0.0055*** -0.0047*** 
(1972-1976) (0.00111) (0.000960) (0.00132) (0.00121) (0.000898) (0.00125) 
       
Placebo Test pass fail pass pass fail pass 
Observations 259,062 571,525 289,872 259,226 571,687 289,932 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0936 0.0917 0.134 0.0254 0.0271 0.0406 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 38: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
parental education levels; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Parental education is… 
more than 
compulsory 
compulsory 
more than 
compulsory 
Compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.282*** 0.453***   
 (0.0591) (0.166)   
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0565 0.230 0.0157*** 0.0525*** 
 (0.0634) (0.156) (0.00517) (0.0184) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.155** 0.237 0.00629 0.0511*** 
 (0.0627) (0.151) (0.00539) (0.0158) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.131* 0.349** 0.00745 0.0385*** 
 (0.0675) (0.140) (0.00555) (0.0147) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.156** 0.232 0.0112* 0.0291* 
 (0.0682) (0.152) (0.00642) (0.0161) 
Untreated cohorts 0.166*** -0.207** -0.00820** -0.0424*** 
(1972-1976) (0.0435) (0.0916) (0.00382) (0.00987) 
     
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,550,081 165,340 544,573 65,609 
R-squared 
‡
 0.175 0.060 0.129 0.051 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 39: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different parental education levels; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE MATH 
Parental education is… 
more than 
compulsory 
compulsory 
more than 
compulsory 
Compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00748*** 0.00949*** -0.000894 -0.000081 
 (0.00110) (0.00258) (0.000702) (0.00245) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00450*** 0.00623** -0.00187*** -0.00436* 
 (0.00111) (0.00246) (0.000696) (0.00229) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.000417 0.00487** -0.00153** -0.00309 
 (0.00119) (0.00243) (0.000697) (0.00208) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.00347*** 0.00312 0.00137 0.00623** 
 (0.00118) (0.00240) (0.000973) (0.00266) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.00307** 0.00308 -0.00113 0.00179 
 (0.00138) (0.00258) (0.00117) (0.00284) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000709 -0.00284* 0.00108 0.00268 
(1972-1976) (0.000838) (0.00158) (0.000665) (0.00175) 
     
Placebo Test fail pass pass pass 
Observations 1,547,652 164,464 1,547,652 164,464 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0574 0.0205 0.133 0.0608 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 40: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 and education 
and employment at age 25 for different parental education levels; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CRIME AGE 22 UNIVERSITY DEGREE AGE 25 EMPLOYED AGE 25 
Parental education 
is… 
more than 
compulsory 
compulsory 
more than 
compulsory✝ 
compulsory 
more than 
compulsory 
compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.000466 0.000236     
 (0.000605) (0.00218)     
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.000532 -0.00328* 0.00466*** 0.0139*** 0.00107 0.0102*** 
 (0.000647) (0.00196) (0.00110) (0.00209) (0.000883) (0.00224) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000552 -0.0055*** 0.00183* 0.00720*** 0.0000 0.00826*** 
 (0.000684) (0.00196) (0.00109) (0.00204) (0.000929) (0.00223) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.00165** -0.00168 -0.000402 0.00494** 0.000632 0.00490** 
 (0.000820) (0.00204) (0.00127) (0.00222) (0.00106) (0.00240) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000335 0.00135 0.000711 -0.00277** -0.0048*** -0.0078*** 
(1972-1976) (0.000485) (0.00134) (0.000766) (0.00138) (0.000705) (0.00159) 
       
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass fail pass 
Observations 1,255,800 153,292 984,366 136,093 984,638 136,207 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0364 0.0366 0.114 0.0375 0.0293 0.0340 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a 
complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes.✝For the outcome “receiving a high grade”, we left out household income and its 
squared term to achieve convergence.  
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Table 41: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
parental migration backgrounds; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Parental migration background 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.381*** 0.0352   
 (0.0572) (0.177)   
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.104 0.0675 0.0156*** 0.0512*** 
 (0.0633) (0.177) (0.00526) (0.0185) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.128** -0.214 0.00507 0.0239 
 (0.0629) (0.178) (0.00538) (0.0178) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.118* 0.0501 0.00284 0.0360** 
 (0.0656) (0.177) (0.00554) (0.0181) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.147** 0.00338 0.0139** 0.00700 
 (0.0677) (0.194) (0.00631) (0.0197) 
Untreated cohorts 0.117*** 0.0868 -0.00834** -0.0369*** 
(1972-1976) (0.0421) (0.138) (0.00378) (0.0135) 
     
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,599,471 115,950 575,487 34,695 
R-squared 
‡
 0.190 0.139 0.139 0.150 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 42: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different parental migration backgrounds; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE MATH 
Parental education is… 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00877*** 0.00683** -0.000227 -0.00457* 
 (0.00108) (0.00288) (0.000701) (0.00270) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00506*** 0.00725** -0.00179** -0.00336 
 (0.00111) (0.00293) (0.000699) (0.00266) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00108 0.00265 -0.00155** -0.00324 
 (0.00118) (0.00298) (0.000695) (0.00272) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.00330*** -0.00161 0.00103 0.00355 
 (0.00117) (0.00298) (0.000994) (0.00306) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.00284** 0.000581 -0.00103 -0.00115 
 (0.00137) (0.00321) (0.00117) (0.00361) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000360 -0.00178 0.00103 0.00333 
(1972-1976) (0.000820) (0.00226) (0.000660) (0.00250) 
     
Placebo Test fail pass pass pass 
Observations 1,596,671 115,445 1,596,671 115,414 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0605 0.0524 0.135 0.121 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 43: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 and education 
and employment at age 25 for different parental migration backgrounds; choice radius 
2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CRIME AGE 22 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE AGE 
25 
EMPLOYED AGE 25 
Parental migration 
background 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish✝ 
both 
immigrants 
at least 
one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.000781 -0.00398     
 (0.000613) (0.00251)     
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.000908 -0.00555** 0.00283*** 0.0115*** 0.00134 0.00672** 
 (0.000647) (0.00251) (0.00108) (0.00286) (0.000857) (0.00307) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000726 -0.0080*** 0.000992 0.00818*** 0.000822 0.00415 
 (0.000682) (0.00257) (0.00108) (0.00296) (0.000905) (0.00309) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.00220*** -0.00674** -0.000755 0.00882*** 0.000575 0.00619* 
 (0.000804) (0.00280) (0.00127) (0.00313) (0.00108) (0.00335) 
Untreated cohorts 4.68e-05 0.00372* 0.00161** -0.0057*** -0.0052*** -0.00373 
(1972-1976) (0.000475) (0.00200) (0.000759) (0.00211) (0.000679) (0.00240) 
       
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass fail pass 
Observations 1,313,155 95,925 1,045,998 74,437 1,046,309 74,523 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0355 0.0319 0.128 0.104 0.0291 0.0300 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a 
complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes.✝For the outcome “receiving a high grade”, we left out household income and 
its squared term to achieve convergence.  
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Table 44: Effect of choice on the percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for local 
areas with high or low/medium youth crime levels; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Local area characteristics 
1990–91 
low/medium 
crime 
high crime 
low/medium 
crime 
high crime 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.191*** 0.458***   
 (0.0678) (0.107)   
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0364 0.208* 0.00750 0.0350*** 
 (0.0756) (0.111) (0.00622) (0.0105) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.185** 0.104 0.00362 0.0133 
 (0.0745) (0.114) (0.00621) (0.0106) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.126* 0.00956 0.00378 0.0140 
 (0.0738) (0.120) (0.00654) (0.0105) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.228*** 0.121 0.00561 0.0176 
 (0.0813) (0.121) (0.00696) (0.0125) 
Untreated cohorts 0.217*** -0.00310 -0.0180** -0.0180** 
(1972-1976) (0.0494) (0.0796) (0.00774) (0.00774) 
     
Placebo Test pass fail pass pass 
Observations 1,400,647 275,140 502,933 92,384 
R-squared 
‡
 0.185 0.194 0.142 0.171 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 45: Effect of choice on the probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math 
for local areas with high or low/medium youth crime levels; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE 
Local area characteristics 
1990–91 
low/medium 
crime 
high crime 
low/medium 
crime 
high crime 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00751*** 0.0136*** -0.00118 0.00102 
 (0.00129) (0.00209) (0.000822) (0.00148) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00520*** 0.00924*** -0.00220*** 0.000486 
 (0.00127) (0.00211) (0.000825) (0.00145) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00213 0.00411* -0.00198** 0.000938 
 (0.00133) (0.00232) (0.000823) (0.00147) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.00261** 0.00263 0.000746 0.00545*** 
 (0.00126) (0.00242) (0.00107) (0.00205) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.00398*** 0.00547** -0.00239* 0.00384 
 (0.00150) (0.00274) (0.00133) (0.00251) 
Untreated cohorts -0.000168 -0.00244 0.00135* 0.000197 
(1972-1976) (0.000937) (0.00161) (0.000775) (0.00138) 
     
Placebo Test fail fail fail pass 
Observations 1,398,201 274,338 1,398,201 274,338 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0588 0.0695 0.133 0.141 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 46: Effect of choice on the percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for local areas with 
high or low/medium youth crime levels; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Local area 
characteristics 
1990–91 
low/medium crime high crime low/medium crime high crime 
non-urban urban non-urban urban 
non-
urban 
urban 
non-
urban 
urban 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988- -0.453*** 0.254*** -0.992 0.649***     
1990 (0.123) (0.0791) (0.752) (0.116)     
Cohorts 1985- -0.378*** 0.130 -1.330 0.395*** 0.0128 0.00819 0.00176 0.0385*** 
1987 (0.133) (0.0897) (0.811) (0.120) (0.0137) (0.00740) (0.0753) (0.0116) 
Cohorts 1982- -0.337** -0.0422 -1.299 0.307** 0.0255* 0.00623 0.00216 0.0141 
1984 (0.140) (0.0873) (0.900) (0.126) (0.0137) (0.00747) (0.0842) (0.0116) 
Cohorts 1979- -0.133 -0.0569 -0.728 0.106 0.00859 0.00534 0.0358 0.0202* 
1981 (0.128) (0.0905) (0.660) (0.132) (0.0129) (0.00805) (0.0688) (0.0118) 
Cohorts 1977- -0.196 -0.131 -0.274 0.0927 0.0104 0.00395 0.0770 0.00134 
1978 (0.146) (0.0967) (0.821) (0.133) (0.0149) (0.00819) (0.0702) (0.0137) 
Untreated cohorts 0.339*** 0.139** 1.798*** -0.130 -0.030*** -0.00144 0.0628 -0.0186** 
(1972-1976) (0.0858) (0.0595) (0.460) (0.0849) (0.00857) (0.00533) (0.0448) (0.00830) 
         
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass pass pass pass fail 
Observations 741,774 658,873 42,720 232,420 266,858 236,075 14,876 77,508 
R-squared 
‡
 0.164 0.201 0.169 0.197 0.124 0.153 0.131 0.179 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete 
list of included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  ‡Pseudo R-squared for 
binary outcomes. 
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Table 47 Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for local areas with 
high or low/medium youth crime levels; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE 
Local area 
characteristics 
1990–91 
low/medium crime high crime low/medium crime high crime 
non-urban urban non-urban urban non-urban urban non-urban urban 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-  -0.00320 0.00707*** -0.00202 0.0146*** -0.005*** 0.000121 -0.00636 -0.00277 
1990 (0.00249) (0.00155) (0.0125) (0.00232) (0.00157) (0.000949) (0.0101) (0.00176) 
Cohorts 1985- -0.000413 0.00499*** 0.0125 0.0101*** -0.005*** -0.000568 -0.0158 -0.00244 
1987 (0.00253) (0.00158) (0.0141) (0.00236) (0.00159) (0.000949) (0.0103) (0.00177) 
Cohorts 1982- -0.00208 0.00264 -0.0137 0.00568** -0.0039** -0.000383 -0.0144 -0.00122 
1984 (0.00251) (0.00163) (0.0157) (0.00259) (0.00155) (0.000964) (0.0104) (0.00174) 
Cohorts 1979- -0.000277 -0.00229 -0.00665 0.00493* -0.00233 0.00285** -0.0140 0.00460** 
1981 (0.00242) (0.00157) (0.0145) (0.00265) (0.00207) (0.00128) (0.0129) (0.00232) 
Cohorts 1977- -0.00196 -0.00261 -0.0143 0.00686** -0.00322 -0.000404 -0.00394 0.00226 
1978 (0.00276) (0.00183) (0.0166) (0.00305) (0.00247) (0.00159) (0.0144) (0.00270) 
Untreated cohorts 0.00187 -0.000362 0.0165** -0.00300* 0.00277* 0.0000985 0.0179** 0.00328** 
(1972-1976) (0.00157) (0.00116) (0.00733) (0.00175) (0.00142) (0.000905) (0.00914) (0.00164) 
         
Placebo Test fail pass pass fail pass pass pass pass 
Observations 740,459 657,742 42,609 231,729 740,459 657,742 42,609 231,729 
R-squared 
‡
 0.0507 0.0657 0.0554 0.0731 0.127 0.140 0.126 0.145 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete list of 
included covariates see Table 5. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
